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resumo 
 
 
O objectivo desta investigação é compreender o impacto da corrupção no comércio dos 
países exportadores de petróleo. Consideramos as possibilidades e os resultados da 
corrupção e o efeito da corrupção no comércio. Utilizando um conjunto de dados de 
painel para 10 países no período 2000-2018, este estudo contribui para a área de 
comércio e corrupção nos países exportadores de petróleo. A primeira parte deste 
estudo expõe as causas da corrupção e apresenta uma revisão literária de muitos autores 
sobre corrupção e comércio em países exportadores de petróleo. A segunda parte 
analisa os métodos e expõe a construção de um modelo econométrico para a estimativa 
do impacto da corrupção. Utilizando um conjunto de dados de painel para 10 países no 
período 2000-2018, este estudo contribui para a área de comércio e corrupção nos 
países exportadores de petróleo. E a última parte apresenta os resultados dos dados de 
pesquisa e avaliação apresentados na terceira parte expor, que uma diminuição na 
corrupção no país exportador melhora o comércio e, do lado dos importadores, uma 
diminuição na corrupção induzirá um aumento no volume do comércio. 
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abstract 
 
 
The aim of this research is to understand the impact of corruption on trade in oil 
exporting countries. We consider the possibilities and outcomes of corruption and the 
effect of corruption on trade. Using a panel data set for 10 countries over the period 
2000-2018, this study contributes to the area of trade and corruption in oil exporting 
countries. The first part of this study exposes the causes of corruption and presents a 
literature review of many authors concerning corruption and trade in oil exporting 
countries. The second part reviews the methods and exposes the construct of an 
econometric model for the estimation of the impact of corruption. Using a panel data  
set for 10 countries over the period 2000-2018, this study contributes to the area of  
trade and corruption in oil exporting countries. And the last part presents the results of 
the research and assessment data results presented in the third part expose, that a 
decrease in corruption in the exporting country improves trade and on the importer side, 
a decrease in corruption will induce an increase in trade volume. 
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Background 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Different levels of corruption we can find in every country. The increasing scale of 
corruption, in many countries of the world, and the increasing degree of its negative impact 
on trade need a new assessment of this phenomenon in modern conditions. Corruption is the 
misuse of one's power for private gain. Corruption classified as grand, petty and political, 
depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs. The main issue of 
combating corruption is one of the infinite issues of the organization of the state. Specific 
measures that can reduce corruption in the state and society and identify and punish those 
involved in corruption play an important role in the fight against corruption. (Transparency 
International) 
In research, perception of corruption has progressed gradually from illegal activity that 
characterizes the beginning of emerging nations to common modes of government that 
overlap with institutional processes. Corruption will manifest as bribing, embezzlement, 
clientelism, bribery, patrimonialism, dependent on a series of social relationships 
(Granovetter, 2007; Rothstein and Varraich, 2017). However, the way corruption looks 
mostly depends on the specific conditions in which it appears. As seen by the Petrobras cases 
in Brazil in 2014, JPMorgan Chase in Nigeria in 2011, or 'Kazakhgate' in Kazakhstan in 
2003, oil-related corruption quickly became a major scandal affecting the highest political 
ranks. After this case the oil sector attracted even more attention, which led to the 
development of researchers in field of corruption in oil exporting countries. 
Relevance and topicality. Among the global problems of our time that determine the future 
state of the economy, there is also a problem with corruption. Corruption is one of the 
challenges of global development. Corruption weakens the rule of law and democracy, 
which leads to human rights violations, impairs mechanisms that have been honed, violates 
human rights, and contributes to the development of crime, terrorism, and other threats to 
international security. 
Nowadays, corruption has spread in many countries. Special departments are created to 
combat them. Corruption exists in all structures, but it can cause particular harm to the 
economy. In this master thesis will be studied the existence of corruption in oil-exporting 
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countries. Oil exports are the important and main branch of development of economy in oil 
exporting countries, and trade as the main interaction with other countries can be subject to 
corruption since it is in oil area money has a large turnover. 
 
Research problems: How does corruption affect international trade in oil exporting 
countries? 
What is the role of “institutional quality” in this relationship? 
 
 
The object of the final master thesis is the impact of corruption on trade. 
 
The aim of the thesis is after the analysis of the theory of corruption and trade to 
create econometrics model of the assessment and to evaluate the impact of corruption on 
trade in oil exporting countries. 
To reach the aim of the paper the following objectives were set: 
 
1. To summarize the theory and research on trade and corruption and make literature 
review of authors that includes research topic of the impact of corruption on trade. 
2. To select a list of countries that are oil exporting countries and have a high level of 
corruption for the econometrics calculation, Estimating the gravity coefficients on a 
list of oil exporting countries and years utilizing different corruption steps. 
3. To analyze the data of trade, corruption and the importance of combating against 
corruption using data from the most concerning database, such as, World 
Competitiveness Report, World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Eurostat, 
World Bank. OECD, CPI and Transparency International. 
4. To create and examinethe data using an econometrics model of panel data to estimate 
the effect of corruption on the trade in oil exporting countries, and in this research 
will be used data methods of a random effect, common effect, fixed effect, Ordinary 
Least Squares estimator (OLS), and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator 
(PPML). 
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The paper is structured in 3 main parts. 
 
The first part. Important aspects of this study in Part One of this final master thesis 
are summarized research issues, questions, including the study's importance, key 
motivations, and literature review. 
The second part. Framework for thesis assessment is composed. Great attention 
will be paid to the Panel Model and the Gravity Model of International Trade as it is the 
main empirical model that will be used in this dissertation to analyses trade. 
In the third part the results of the assessment are analyzed and discussed, and the 
importance and impact of corruption on trade in oil exporting countries is summarized. 
Research methods. Data from the most concerning database, such as, World 
Competitiveness Report, World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Eurostat, World 
Bank, OECD, and tradingeconomics.com are used. This research examines the theoretical 
part and collect empirical data using econometrics model of panel data to estimate the effect 
of corruption on the trade in oil exporting countries. The use of panel data, the analytical 
tools used in this research will be random, common effect, fixed effect, Ordinary Least 
Squares(OLS) estimator, and Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). For the 
econometrics estimation of international trade and corruption will be used the gravity model 
by using data about the level of corruption and the volume of exporting oil from the 
countries. 
Information sources. OECD, World Bank, Eurostat, World Competitiveness, 
tradingeconomics.com, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Corruption 
Perception Index, Global Economic Data, Indicators, Charts& Forecasts. 
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I. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter covers the theoretical part of the impact of corruption on trade in oil-exporting 
countries. Opinions and views of authors who publish their vision on this topic will be 
considered. In the first part, we will look at the theory of corruption, which will cover the 
topic of corruption in oil exporting countries, as well as the impact of corruption on trade. 
In the second part, you will see a review of the literature of many authors who cover the 
topic of trade. And the last part summarizes the research of the impact of corruption on trade 
analysis. 
 
 
1.1. Theories of corruption and its evaluation 
Corruption raises the degree of uncertainty and the likelihood of violence by 
undermining the authority and prestige of state agencies, and compromising attempts to 
establish peace and preserve peace. Parallel to that, corruption generates dynamics of 
wrongdoing which may not have occurred previously. The studies below aim at different 
aspects of the effect of corruption on oil exporting countries. 
Corruption erodes trust in government and undermines the social contract. Corruption 
impedes investment, with consequent effects on growth and jobs. Countries capable of 
confronting corruption use their human and financial resources more efficiently, attract more 
investment, and grow more rapidly (World Bank, 2018). 
Corruption in oil industry regulation is often referred to as prevalent variations in the extent 
to which the oil industry benefits host countries. Improved access to information, active 
journalism, and watchdog non-governmental organizations all encouraged international 
comparisons. Many countries, like Norway, are praised for their strong oil wealth 
management. Despite the development in the oil industry (GDP per capita in Nigeria 
concerning Purchasing power parity (PPS)), other sectors, such as Nigeria and Angola, were 
experiencing a negative economic increase at the same level as in 1970. 
"Resource curse theories" are important to understand the structural problems faced by oil- 
rich nations, and corruption is a significant cause for the "carbon curse" theory. Nevertheless, 
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our knowledge of how corruption currently affects major decisions in the petroleum industry 
is limited and policymakers have only outdated information on the main risk fields. This 
section provides a fundamental survey of the study of how and why corruption can 
misrepresent or prevent effective oil sector regulation. The emphasis is primarily on the roles 
played by host governments, private petroleum companies, and donor governments, but the 
position of state-owned national petroleum companies (NOCs) and others is also 
increasingly dominant. We begin a debate on emerging petroleum patterns of corruption 
significance and then examine the risks of corruption in the regulatory process. The early 
literature on resort-rich socioeconomic development attributed its misleading economic 
success to a 'curse' in which the assumption was that countries with an abundance of natural 
resources simply cannot develop as quickly as countries lacking  such resources  (Sachs 
and Warner, 1994). The curse 's original understanding was based on a pure economic basis, 
which argued that massive losses of wealth contributed, amongst other diseases, to the Dutch 
epidemic, general macroeconomic chaos, and debt overhang (Corden, 1984). The following 
literature notes that oil wealth decreases growth, because it may cause corruption and profits 
— a voracious effect that affects long-term growth (Tornell and Lane, 1999). This may have 
a negative impact. During the boom in the resource sector, the connection between oil and 
corruption is becoming clearer, which is starting to turn capital into less profitable and rent- 
generating activities such as white elephants, which are negative social surplus investment 
projects (Robinson and Torvik (2005), Collier and Goderis (2007)). 
The resource phenomenon study – which shows how petroleum revenues can make 
governments deviate from social welfare policies – tends to be negatively affected by very 
low growth, low human development, and high levels of poverty and inequality (Ross 
(1999), Sachs & Warner (1995), Bulte et al. (2005)). The resource curse is described by a 
variety of problems including Netherlands diseases, rent demand, sponsorship, and 
institutional degradation. Governance and corruption as key factors affecting how countries 
tackle these issues are given substantial contributions to literature (Robinson et al., (2006), 
Kolstad and Søreide, (2009)). The wide range of discussions and policy approaches 
including the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), include how poor 
governance and corruption – both at and outside the oil industry – affect income 
management, public spending decisions, and wealth levels in oil producers' countries. 
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However, both the resource literature ignores the question as to whether bad governance and 
corruption can influence actual petroleum production. 
Recent research of Bhattacharyya Sambit & Hodler Roland, 2010, and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi, 
Raimundo Soto, 2016, shows that oil wealth, growth, and corruption relationships are 
dependent upon institutional quality and, in particular, the availability of controls and 
balance sheets that restrict the abuse of political power and resource rent. 
Corruption can also result in a conspiracy between private and public actors, where 
existing institutional mechanisms make it easier to extract rents. In the absence of 
transparency of oil-related financial transactions, such mechanisms are maintained and 
officials have limited liability for such transactions. Because governments have no 
incentives to achieve proper project selection and public procurement policies, they are 
likely to allocate discretionary allowances for projects that enable bribing or political 
incentives to be received (World Bank, 2007). These outcomes in an improper allocation of 
public resources, which include expenditures for financing which do not focus on the most 
effective and efficient projects (Mauro, (1996) and Tanzi (1998)). At the same time, 
ineffective management support for private staff with vested interests is also being 
encouraged (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). Governments have also the ability, to obtain a 
policy or personal benefits at public expense (World Bank, 2007), to control innovations of 
industrial policy, including the implementation of laws and the granting of exclusive rights 
and tax incentives. 
Oil is almost universally regarded as a strategically important resource. (Daniel 
Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw 1998) From the governments of the producing countries, oil is 
one of the "team heights" of the economy, which explains the government's broad 
involvement in the industry. Government intervention can be varied, from resource 
ownership to policy and legislation, to control access to resources, infrastructure, and 
operations regulation before national oil companies are organized. Each form of government 
intervention can open up countless opportunities for corruption (McPherson, Charles. 2003). 
At the level of consumer governments, the understanding of the strategic importance 
of oil raises strong concerns about the reliability of its supplies. This concern often leads to 
agreements   with   producing   governments   to   ensure   the   security   of  supplies. Such 
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arrangements can create conditions for corruption at different levels. New influential 
consumers from developing countries are making no secret of their desire to secure oil 
supplies by entering into opaque agreements with producers from developing countries. The 
largest consumers from developing countries also allow themselves to ensure the reliability 
of supplies, if not directly involved in corruption, then at least to exploit their economic, 
political or military influence on producers from developing countries. At the same time, 
they can tolerate the corrupt behavior of developing country Governments so as not to harm 
the security of supply. The press has repeatedly shown examples of this contradictory 
attitude of the Governments of developed countries towards alleged cases of corruption and 
human rights violations. 
Corruption in the oil sector can be characterized by describing the channels through 
which it is carried out. Below are the four most common types of corruption. 
Political corruption. The purpose of political corruption is to influence policy in the 
sector, as well as to adopt laws and tax regimes that bring political or personal benefits to 
the detriment of the public interest. Condescending foreign policy, tax incentives, price 
controls, exceptional rights, unique of accounting methods, and a host of specific industry 
and territorial concessions that are typical of the oil industry — all of this can be attributed 
to the category of political corruption. Openly illegal actions such as offering a bribe in this 
area are not always found. A most important role is played by so-called legislative corruption 
(Kaufmann, Daniel, and Pedro Vincente. 2005.). 
 
Political 
corruption 
Administrative 
corruption 
Commercial 
corruption 
Large-scale 
corruption 
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Figure 1. Types of corruption in the oil sector 
 
Source: Illustration based [Kaufmann, Daniel, and Pedro Vincente. 2005, Walker 2004]. 
 
Administrative corruption. With a rank slightly lower than political, this type of corruption 
is associated with abuse of official authority and illegal receipt of advantages in exchange 
for approval of a wide array of business and economic processes, for favorable treatment of 
satisfactory interpretation or corrupt behavior of tax legislation. As in the case of political 
corruption, the concept of legislative corruption is quite applicable here. 
Commercial corruption. This is a wide area of procurement abuse, including bid fraud, 
kickbacks, and inflating costs. Given the volume of industry operations, the scale of 
corruption in this area is staggering. One of the most recent examples of large-scale 
procurement abuses is the well-publicized scandals of inflating the cost of rebuilding Iraq's 
oil sector, which involves mainly American contractors (Walker 2004). 
Large-scale corruption. The direct misappropriation through misuse of production capacity, 
goods, or incomes of a significant amount of money may also be defined as massive 
corruption. Investigators allege that General Sani Abacha, the President of Nigeria from 
1993-1998, transferred tens of millions of dollars a month from the government's oil 
revenues to the accounts of offshore banks and companies controlled by his family. 
Svensson (2005) defines corruption as the abuse of public office as the basis of personal 
benefit to justify the underlying theory. The theoretical research on corruption has the 
advantage of taking advantage of the wider literature to promote criminal activity in 
situations where the potential costs and advantages of its acts are weighed by fair 
lawbreakers (Becker, 1968). The theoretical study of corruption Law violators indulges in 
illegal acts if the predicted benefits outweigh the potential costs. Benefits can consist of 
preferential care, services not eligible to receive government contracts, or a rejection of the 
queue to receive services. For natural resources, incentives or export quotas can provide 
benefits. A fine or a jail sentence may be the cost of engaging in a corruption act. Political, 
social, and cultural factors affect even the interpretation of the corrupt act. Therefore, the 
role of the government to counter corruption is twofold: streamline leakage (profit of 
corruption) reduction procedures, thus increasing the time spent in jail and punishing 
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responsible persons. The more systematic corruption is practiced by the government, the 
greater the extent of corruption. 
Corruption scientists used these basic theories to explain the motivation to participate in 
corrupt behaviors and included aspects of corrupt conduct. Throughout the literature on 
industrial organizations and auctions, this paper is used as a basis for establishing the impact 
of discretion among government officials throughout terms of the role of bribe-takers and 
bribe-donors in granting benefits and competition (Rose-Ackerman, (1997), and Shleifer, 
(1993 and 1999)). In other words, the study of opportunities for unethical practices was the 
primary focus in this regard. We depend on this study both on corruption theory and the 
curse of wealth theory. 
In comparison, we illustrate the effect on perceptions of corruption of the various tools. The 
reason for the relation between the availability of resources and the rent-oriented behavior 
is that the availability of resources transfers focusses from output to resource rental usage of 
certain entrepreneurs. It makes the synthesis of resource capture competitions (Wick and 
Bulte, (2006), Brunnschweiler and Bulte, (2007)). Impatience or urgency in obtaining these 
rents results in demands for bribes (Baland & Francois (2000) for theoretical models, and 
Torvik (2002), Stevens (2003) for a review of literature). In this context, qualitative 
differences will influence the tendency for legal or illegal (corrupt) purchases of resources. 
Agricultural land, for example, is easier to plunder or to tax than mines or oil wells (Mehlum 
et al., 2006). 
Measurement difficulties complicate the calculation of the expense of corruption (Galtung 
(2005), Heller (2009)). The main difficulties in measuring are: 1 ) different acceptance of 
the term corruption; 2) differences in the levels of corruption suspected and actual; 3) 
aggregation difficulties when data are collected from various corruption surveys to produce 
a single indicator (for instance the transparency international corruption sensitivity index 
[CPI]), and 4) limited methodologies, that can appropriately demonstrate the causal links 
between corruption and growth (as opposed to purely associative links). 
Most corruption assessments have traditionally been focused on surveys on perception. Such 
perception surveys benefit from good reporting – asking people for the impression of 
corruption is much easier than actually assessing corruption directly. The majority of cross- 
country indexes of corruption, such as the CPI and the World Bank Anti-Corruption Index 
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are still established. They still have the largest number of international indices for corruption. 
In some of the first empiric studies on the economy of corruption, such as the Mauro cross- 
country (1995) research on the relationship between corruption and economic development, 
perception-based metrics have also been used. 
Visions by bribery respondents can be the most effective way of calculating bribery. The 
stigma associated with paying bribes is fairly low in most cases, and bribery can also be 
assessed using surveys of businesses or households. An example of this is the study of 
companies in Uganda by Svensson (2003), who has investigated the amount of bribes they 
have received. On average, the businesses surveyed report paying approximately $88 per 
worker or approximately 8% of its overall costs. 
Sometimes, the only way to assess corruption is to detect it directly. Needless to 
say, this is difficult, as officials seldom allow unethical conduct to be observed. There are, 
however, some important examples of the direct detection of illegal behavior. One such 
example of a case of Montesinos in Peru, reported by Mr. McMillan and Mr. Zoido (2004). 
Montesinos, who was the head of the secret police under President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 
bribed judges, politicians, and news media to support the Fujimori dictatorship. Incredibly, 
he maintained meticulous documents, signed contracts of bribery, and videotapes of bribery, 
which became public after the collapse of the Fujimori regime. Mr. McMillan and Mr. Zoido 
use them to measure the expense of bribing different forms of government officials. On 
average, politicians received bribes ranging from USD 3,000 to USD 50,000 per month, 
depending on whether the politician was in the opposition party (higher) or the Fujimori 
party (lower), with judges receiving bribes of the same magnitude. The media bribes were 
orders of greater magnitude — as much as USD 1.5 million a month for the sponsorship of 
one television station. 
In certain situations, the market balance principle, combined with market activity data, can 
be used to estimate the amount of corruption. In a pioneering analysis, Fisman (2001) used 
this method to estimate the importance of political relations with Indonesian President 
Soeharto. Furthermore, he received an estimation from the Jakarta consultancy firm of how 
much every publicly traded company was linked to Soeharto on a scale of 0-4. He then 
calculated how far the price of each company jumped when Soeharto fell ill to measure the 
importance of such political relations on the stock market. If the market hypothesis is 
effective, the change in the value of the stock market surrounding these events will capture 
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the value of the political relationship with the firm. Because investment bankers in Jakarta 
calculated that the overall market would decline by 20% if Soeharto died, they can calibrate 
these figures to estimate the total value of Soeharto 's connections. On the net, the most 
affiliated firms estimate that Soeharto's connections accounted for about 23 percent of their 
value. 
It is widely held that "good governance" is required for growth to take place. This implies 
that corruption must be bad for growth. Empirical studies present a more complicated picture 
(Carothers and de Gramont, (2011), Norris (2011), Zhuang et al., (2010)). A significant body 
of research shows that corruption levels do not explicitly assess economic development rates. 
Many other governance parameters besides corruption may be much more important. 
Zhuang et al. (2010) find in a study of developing countries in Asia that policy performance, 
the rule of law and the standard of regulation are stronger linked to economic growth than 
corruption, voice and accountability (V&A) or politics is correlated with. 
Many cases of profit diversion from commodities trading have been recorded since the end 
of the 1990s. Some of these case studies have been carried out by foreign organizations 
(World Bank (2000), in connection with the oil for food scandal: IIC (2005)). Others 
originate with non-governmental organizations (e.g., GW 1999; 2002; 2005; 2006; 2013; 
BD 2013a; 2013b; 2015; NRGI, 2015d). These cases are often restricted to the newspapers. 
Case studies are less often supported by court documents. These cases show that the above- 
mentioned risks occur and offer valuable insight into the strategies and methods used. 
However, attempts to systematize such data – and to analyze patterns – are seldom. While 
the OECD study did not contain a summary of trade data, it is one of the two exceptions that 
we have found. This helps us to draw some conclusions about the position of intermediaries 
in 49 out of 130 cases of natural resource corruption. It allows one to take into account the 
scope and sophistication of corruption schemes. Of the 130 incidents, 21 involved complex 
transactions in which various shell companies were involved (OECD 2016, 7). Secondary 
literature also recognizes the position of these actors, who are euphemistically referred to as 
business people or big people (McPherson and MacSearraigh 2007, 207). Those findings are 
also consistent with the results of an inquiry into illicit financial flows, in particular the 
widespread use of shell companies for covering fraudulent transactions or obstructing 
judicial proceedings (WB, UNODC, and Star 2011). Secondly, the 2016 NRGI study 
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investigated eleven cases of oil or gas abuse (NRGI 2016). The research also reveals that 
collusion exists at various stages of sales from choosing customers to decide on purchases 
and transfers of funds. These two reports explain in detail the steps to prevent such robbery. 
1.2. Specificity of corruption in oil industry 
 
The use of intermediaries between the public body and the final buyer in some situations is 
more complicated. The process is simple: instead of directly paying bribes, goods are sold 
to the recipient State – often to postal firms – to intermediaries at a discount and instead, 
these intermediaries sell them to well-known merchants at nearly instant market price. The 
beneficiaries of the intermediary who can become a PEP in the receiving State or an 
individual near to the PEP (Fig. 2) have an unjustified income. By placing an intermediary 
under an appropriate competence, beneficiary owner may remain anonymous and reduce 
income taxes for their company. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The mechanism of corruption in oil sector 
Oliver Longchamp and Natalie Perrot: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 
 
Case examples 
 
A striking example of such a scheme is the company Philia, based in Geneva. Philia 
was founded in October 2012 and has no world trade experience and in 2013 was granted a 
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special contract by the Congo (Brazzaville) oil refining firm Coraf, without public tenders 
for exports of petroleum products. This means that Philia acted as a broker between Coraf 
and the foreign market and sold their cargo at no extra cost to third parties – generally 
established traders. He took the margins by providing a logistics service that virtually did 
not exist. Filia belongs to a shareholder who is a friend of the son of the Congo President. 
Finally, he is also Coraf's General Manager and signs the contract which has been so 
beneficial to Philia (BD 2015). The sole shareholder declined to have a business arrangement 
with the son of the President when the investigation started. The release of subsequent 
Panama studies however revealed that Philia 's owners and President's son had contracts in 
Mossack Fonseca with the same offshore company (Tilouine, 2016). 
Identifying corruption-prone governance practices is one of the EITI's most valuable 
and unique contributions to combating corruption. The EITI research has established 
processes and procedures in a number of countries that may easily lead to corruption if this 
is not done already. Such vulnerabilities are also country-specific and are therefore 
especially effective in recognizing them by the country-specific nature of EITI studies. 
Substantially discretionary licensing decisions are the related processes opened through 
EITI; extra-budgetary accounts subject to control restriction; transfer of money or non- 
accumulated goods; money-purchases but little-doing subsidiaries; license holders who do 
not fall under the jurisdiction of the tax authorities; legal and regulatory provisions to 
encourage corruption. The EITI study identified common activities and was closely checked 
by representatives of the MSG and other stakeholders. This led to a reform in some cases. 
This powerful, dynamic can limit corruption in the system to some of the easiest ways. 
When the EITI first emerged at the market, some observers thought that all of the 
dirty dealings in the sector might pull the curtain back. Indeed, in some cases, EITI reports 
contain data that is initiated or informed about further investigations of certain transactions 
with external parties. One journalist revealed several mining enterprises in Cameroon using 
EITI reports in Liberia. xi. Indonesian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) used EITI 
data to demonstrate that mining firms operate out the front of their territory, as well as in 
protected forests, and the Global Witness and The Guardian used EIT-ID data to raise 
questions about the licensing transaction. In its investigations on the DRC's largest state- 
owned mining company, the Carter Center and the Global Witness used EITI reports. 
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At present, some actors are discussing the EITI to over-sell their ability to fight 
corruption and discuss its involvement as evidence of a well-controlled corruption (the 
challenge of "whitewashing" mentioned above). Others unfairly criticize the EITI for 
continuing corruption in its member countries or for poorly assessing cross-national 
corruption measures. The EITI could make its role in the fight against corruption more 
clearly known. This enhanced message could: 
• Explain the strengths and limitations of the EITI, as described above; 
 
• Address corruption more explicitly in the various implementation documents, 
including to justify why certain types of information are required to be disclosed; 
• Recognize openly that some participants of EITI are facing serious corruption 
challenges and that validation does not measure corruption control; 
• Compile evidence of how the EITI is trying to fight corruption, such as through 
more systematic study of the uses of EITI data noted in Section II; and, 
• Make it clear that the EITI is just one part of what is needed to curb corruption in 
the extractive field and cannot be a proxy for a sufficient reaction against corruption. The 
Secretariat could guide how different stakeholders should communicate this nuance, for 
example by signing up companies, describing good validation results, or applying EITI- 
related conditionality by donors. The Board may address the issue of "whitewashing" and 
give the practitioners a cautionary note. 
We have also attempted to demonstrate why corruption so badly impacts the oil 
sector, identify ways of corruption and list the main players in corruption relationships, and 
list the types of corrupt practices in each link in the oil industry's value chain. This final 
segment addresses alternative solutions and strategies to tackle corruption. We should, 
however, make a few reservations before making any recommendations. First, it should be 
remembered that the corruption attractiveness of the sector is extremely high. Interest groups 
that oppose reform are very powerful and do not lack funds. All the investigations mentioned 
here are about corruption networks, not individuals, and these networks are most often 
international. One network generates another, causing the networks to spread like an 
infection. For this reason, eradicating corruption in the oil sector is an extremely difficult 
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and even dangerous task that can take a long time to solve. A sustained and strong 
commitment to fighting high-level corruption is essential for success here. 
Secondly, anti-corruption programs in the petroleum sector would have a much 
greater chance of success if they are incorporated into a wider national system to improve 
international governance and corruption. Fortunately, thanks to the Internet and other means 
of communication, the international community and local communities are very well aware 
of the ravages of corruption, and reforms today have a broad base of supporters. 
Thirdly, and in other areas too-governmental, industrial, civil society, financial, 
development, and development organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF-depend 
on the successful fight against corruption in the petroleum industries. As developing 
countries are often overlooked here, their role and responsibilities need to be given particular 
attention. There is a tendency to view corruption in the oil sector, particularly in the context 
of development, as a problem in the developing world. However, for several reasons, this 
approach does not correspond to reality. As the examples in this section illustrate, in 
developed world cases corruption also exists directly or indirectly between corporations and 
organizations in the developing world, as well as in the governments of the nation in which 
they are based. While this may be difficult to achieve by many standards, diplomatic and 
otherwise, governments in developing countries should make an effort to stop sending 
ambiguous signals to countries fighting corruption in the oil sector. 
The strategic essence of oil has a destructive effect on the values of the most 
influential developed countries of the world. Too often, simultaneous praise for governments 
in countries with high levels of corruption undermines the effectiveness of sectoral 
campaigns which can be carried out through bilateral or multilateral means with the support 
and consent of developed countries – praise supported by developed countries' interest in 
securing or prevention of oil supplies. However, the behavior of too few players across 
developing countries in comparison to more aggressive activities shows that corruption is 
not just an alien disease polluted with abroad by westerners. Quite the other way around! 
Corruption has deep origins in the developed world, and a toxic combination is created when 
the West's greed meets development politics. An adjustment against corruption in the 
petroleum sector, which exclusively or primarily focuses on developing countries, is bound 
to fail. 
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Fourth, the fight against corruption in any industry, including the oil sector, requires 
resources-certain knowledge and abilities and adequate funding. The required set of 
resources ranges from managing information campaigns, technical support, the ability to set 
up government agencies and build civil society, conducting complex investigations, and 
conducting surveillance. You can't go far with rhetoric that isn't backed up by resources. And 
finally, it all depends on the situation. A crisis, for example, maybe the most favorable 
moment to launch an anti-corruption campaign. As a priority, the oil sector was centered as 
the local and foreign public viewed it as the most corrupt, and corruption was spreading from 
the oil industry not just to other sectors of the economy but to society in general. The oil 
sector received priority attention. Subject to these reservations or concerns, the desirable 
characteristics of any anti-corruption initiatives should include leadership or support, a 
reform context that goes beyond the oil sector alone, a coalition of supporters, adequate 
resources and funding, favorable conditions, and a willingness to "seize the opportunity". 
Table 1. Corruption in the oil sector: summary characteristic 
 
Value chain in 
the oil sector 
Corruption 
vulnerability 
Signal indicator Recommended 
countermeasures 
Exploration * Policy 
formulation 
* Laws, contracts, 
taxation 
* Licensing, 
Conclusion of 
contracts 
* Obtaining 
permits and visas 
* Lack of clear 
policy; 
* Non-transparent, 
incomplete legal 
framework and tax 
system; 
* Direct non- 
transparent 
negotiations 
Under license; 
* "Unbalanced"," 
suspicious " choice 
of contractors; 
At the conclusion of 
contracts; 
* Delays in granting 
permits and 
obtaining visas; 
* Clear, publicly 
announced policies; 
* Improving the legal 
framework and tax 
system; 
* Transparent, simple 
tenders for obtaining 
licenses, publication of 
results; 
* Transparent public 
reports on issuing 
permits; 
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Table 1. Corruption in the oil sector: summary characteristic (to be continued) 
 
 
Value chain in the 
oil sector 
Corruption 
vulnerability 
Signal indicator Recommended 
countermeasures 
Development and 
production 
* Obtaining permits 
and visas; 
* Custom; 
* Theft of products 
or revenue; 
*Delays in granting 
permissions; 
* Limited use of the 
international 
competitive bidding 
procedure, 
Tenders, non- 
transparent tenders; 
* "Suspicious" or 
repetitive selection 
of contractors 
during procurement; 
* Rumors of abuse; 
* Aggressive 
rhetoric about 
national interests; 
* Differences in 
energy; 
* The lack of 
consideration; 
* Transparent 
public reports on 
issuing permits; 
* Transparent 
competitive 
procurement 
procedure; 
* Publication of 
results; • Reliable 
procedures for the 
appeal or 
contestation; 
* Regular volume 
control and 
reconciliation; 
Trade and 
transportation 
*Understating the 
cost or volume; 
* Illegal rent- 
seeking to access to 
the infrastructure; 
* Prices are below 
public guidelines; 
* Differences in 
energy 
* Non-transparent 
sales reporting or 
lack of reporting; 
* Unusually wide 
use of 
intermediaries; 
* Full open trade 
and sales reporting; 
* Openness tenders 
for choosing 
intermediaries; 
* Periodic sales 
audit; 
* Amount of checks 
and reconcile; 
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Table 1. Corruption in the oil sector: summary characteristic (to be continued) 
 
 
Value chain in the 
oil sector 
Corruption 
vulnerability 
Signal indicator Recommended 
countermeasures 
Trade and 
transportation 
 * Misuse reports; 
* Infrastructure 
Connection Queues; 
* Clear well-known 
network control 
rules and tariffs; 
  * Appeals and 
complaints 
procedures; 
Processing and 
marketing 
* Formulation of 
policies in the final 
market, such as 
price regulation; 
* Black market, 
smuggling; 
* Price control; 
* Non-transparent; 
purchases of 
petroleum products; 
* Queues, shortage 
of oil products; 
* Clear policy; 
* Liberalization of 
prices (transparent 
allocation of 
income); 
* Competitive, open 
 * Falsification of 
petroleum products; * Difference of 
tenders; 
 
* Purchase of 
volume;  
 petroleum products;   
Enterprise 
accounting and 
Finance 
* Inconsistent 
reporting; 
* Tax evasion; 
* Misuse of funds; 
* Money- 
laundering; 
* Limited 
transparency, 
secrecy; 
* Tax exemption or 
unusually low tax 
burden; 
* Poor quality audit; 
* Comprehensive, 
transparent audit, 
publication of audit 
results; 
* Qualified and 
independent tax and 
cost audits; 
 
 
McPherson, C. and Mac Searraigh, S. (2007), Corruption in the Petroleum Sectors, 
p. 191 
 
The map for the official mentioned at the commencement of this Chapter is 
summarized in Table 1. He splits into many sections the value chain in the oil sector, 
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identifying places that are vulnerable to corruption, suggesting signs, and providing 
suggestions for combating corruption. The problem of corruption in the oil sector is 
extremely serious, but the results of success should be no less impressive, in any case, they 
are worth fighting for. A better understanding of the phenomenon, new initiatives and a 
reduction intolerance towards corruption give hope that efforts to combat this phenomenon 
have not been wasted. 
1.3. Theory of Trade 
 
Trade is a growth driver that creates employment, reduces poverty and increases 
economic opportunities. Because of the global development underpinned by free trade since 
1990, over one billion people have been rising out of poverty. The World Bank Community 
is supportive of a free, transparent, stable, foreign trade environment. By providing 
customers more competitive products and services, free trade provides important, yet 
ignored advantages to lower-income households. Developing countries also contend with 
indirect factors impeding their exposure to foreign markets, such as anti-competitive trading 
policies, regulatory conditions unfavorable to corporate development and innovation, or 
insufficient infrastructure ability. Even a country with a free and open foreign strategy loses 
if its economies become unconnected, because many of the world's poorest citizens reside 
in countries that are landlocked, isolated, or even poorly supported by international trading 
ties. Through addressing these obstacles, the World Bank Community helps its member 
countries strengthen their exposure to developing country markets and increase their 
involvement in the world economy. Trade will contribute to job reductions in many regions 
and sectors, despite the economic growth and the technical advancements that follow it. The 
World Bank Community is working to promote strategies that enable all countries to take 
advantage of the prospects emerging from trade and technological change. These include 
short-term responses such as training programs and job search assistance, but also long-term 
solutions that build more resilient economies. The world needs to strengthen the global 
trading system to promote greater inclusiveness and help developing countries address trade- 
related constraints to growth. Tensions are confronting the framework of global trade laws 
that have nurtured exponential economic development over multiple generations. Such 
strains would not preclude future trade regulation could stop the global economy from 
looking at the specific untapped benefits (World Bank,2019). 
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International trade is critical to the development and is a primary factor of 
globalization and local market prospects. Export finance is important for the transport of 
products at all levels of the supply chain, which can have a significant effect on developing 
countries (World Bank,2015). 
From an international economic viewpoint, Dutt and Traca (2009) offer one of the 
most compelling explanations of the beneficial consequences of corruption, describing 
circumstances in which border corruption can improve trade. Nevertheless, there are no clear 
signs as a standard rule of thumb that corruption spurs economic growth. The same standard 
approach to gravity used to forecast bilateral trade flows stems from Newton's physics 
gravity equation which predicts the gravitational force between two point masses. 
According to Thedeγ S. and Gustafsonη N. (2010) because of its good explanatory 
capacity, the application of the gravity formula to the estimation of trade flows is very 
common, and our methodological definition relies on a considerable literature covering the 
correct usage of the gravity equation based on economic theoretical underpinnings and 
econometric considerations. The methodological approach of this research has been inspired 
in particular by the interventions of Anderson and Marcouiller (2002), Anderson and 
Wincoop (2003), Dutt and Traca (2009), Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008), and Silva 
and Tenreyro (2009). Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and Anderson and Wincoop (2003) 
demonstrate that in order to make reliable forecasts of reciprocal product movements, 
account must be taken off the export effects of national price indices. Helpman, Melitz, and 
Rubinstein (2008) demonstrate how systematic trade theoretical advances on firm 
heterogeneity can be integrated into the definition of the gravity model while Silva and 
Tenreyro (2009) discuss their methodological definition in depth. As mentioned earlier, Dutt 
and Traca (2009) provide an equation of gravity which integrates the effects of border 
corruption on trade. 
Kruger (1974) introduces the first exchange and rental system. Quantitative controls on 
imports grant legal importers monopoly rights, thus creating incentives for commercial 
practices aimed at obtaining rents (in comparison to tariffs, the Quotas, and other official 
permits). Agents may enter into legal competition or unlawfully engage in rent-seeking 
activities such as smuggling, black markets, bribery, and corruption. This practice, Kruger 
shows, causes a divergence between social and private costs and forces the economy to 
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function in a sub-optimal way. In addition to trade barriers, the economy still faces social 
security costs. 
1.4. Research on corruption and trade 
 
The effect of corruption on trade is discussed by De Jong and Bogmans (2011) and 
shown that corruption has an influence on trade as a whole. This can be demonstrated by the 
extra expenses incurred by both importers and exporters. But abuse will also contribute to 
reduce the expense of inadequate border controls. Corruption has a positive impact on 
imports in its role as a "pace currency" (De Jong and Bogmans, 2011). In this situation, 
cheating acts as a means to resolve more profoundly ingrained flaws or inefficiencies, in the 
context of poor procedural productivity for example. 
Wei (2000) suggests another framework for clarification of trade-corruption ties and 
takes into account the costs and benefits of public officials monitoring. He argues that the 
efficiency and the ability of the institutions to fight corruption crucially depend on the money 
the country has earmarked for this purpose. A nation spends more when its advantages 
outweigh costs to boost the efficiency of these internal institutions. 
To check the argument that restricted trade shifts capital from productive activities 
to rental activities, Torres (2002) examines the relationship between trade and corruption. 
The study has shown that a negative relationship exists for more empirical evidence, but it 
is not trustworthy. 
In the former Soviet Socialist Republics Union (USSR), where required measures to 
privatize the economy and reform trade rules following the collapse of socialism were often 
followed by systemic corruption, evidence of positive ties between trade openness and 
corruption was first found in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe (Transparency 
International 2005, p.271). 
Openness to trade can also generate new corruption opportunities. Tanzi (1998) states 
that liberalization of trade generates new incentives for corruption, including the value of 
bribery in securing international contracts or preferential market access, or such similar 
benefits as tax cuts. Bribery maximizes government and corporate shared interests. 
Politicians want the re-election to remain in control, and they need money to finance their 
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An increase in trade openness 
campaigns, while companies need opportunities. Politicians, therefore, have an opportunity 
to grant payments to businesses or other benefits. 
These studies show that further policy changes are necessary to ensure a positive welfare 
impact. Such studies do not, however, equate more institutional reforms with corruption. 
Similarly, trade and corruption literature lacks the importance of more institutional changes 
in the fight against corruption. This study explores this discrepancy by stressing the 
importance of more policy changes to reduce corruption. 
Figure3. Theory of corruption decreasing trade 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Krueger (1974), Ades and DI Tella (1999), Wei (1999), Gatti (2004) 
 
To research the economic growth function of natural resources, the mechanisms that 
connect natural resource availability with low economic indicators need to be investigated. 
The literature addresses many political and economic explanations why natural resources 
have not been translated into economic development, such as Dutch diseases, political rents 
and corruption, low institutional efficiency, commodity market volatility and a lack of 
diversification. 
Corruption decreases 
Incentives for good governance Less motivation for bribes 
Incentives for lower cost for 
international contracts 
Reduces their ability to pay a bribe 
Increase foreign stakeholders Reduces monopoly rents for 
businesses 
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Natural Resources 
revenue boom 
Inflation and real 
exchange rate 
appreciation 
The price of products 
increased making them 
expensive in 
comparison to the 
world price of the 
market. 
Increase in resource 
rents 
Decreasing output is 
unrelated to capital in 
other sectors. As a 
result, profits and 
employment are 
decreasing. 
The Dutch disease is one of the most famous supposed economic explanations for the 
resource curse. In most resource-rich countries non-resource sectors are likely to be 
influenced by a major national monetary increase as the resource income from natural 
resources is partial to domestic non-tradable sectors (Corden and Neary (1982), Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007), Iimi (2007)). This makes products from non- 
resource industries (normally manufacturing) more expensive relative to the world market 
and less competitive in these industries. As a result, the net national income falls, resulting 
in economic growth slowing down. It is called the "waste effect" of this process. 
Figure 4. The spending effect in the ‘Dutch disease’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Badeeb, Lean and Clark (2017). 
 
The so-called 'resource curse' is rich in literature. Some data from across the 
Developing World suggest that natural-infrastructure rich nations, in particular, due to the 
momentum and stimulus that resource-growing industries aspire to develop for the 
governing elites (Asemoglu and Johnson, (2005), Humphries et al., (2007), Vicente (2010) 
all surveys, Standard 2-stake analysis and other survey results, Standard 2-stage regression 
analysis). 
Results of resource management studies indicate that the increased autonomy of people by 
the state decreases the need to establish long-term specific political agreements with 
different classes of society for state representatives (Sogge, 2006). The abundance of oil and 
diamonds and other resources, including gold, was, if not, a major factor in weakening 
Decrease in world 
demand for country’s 
non-resource products. 
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transparency, fracturing the bonds between government and society, and enabling those in 
charge to operate large patronage networks while being oblivious to the general public. In 
reality, it leads, inter alia, to an overall impression that public services are a public benefit 
rather than a benefit in the argument, thereby undermining vertical accountable mechanisms 
(Moore (2004), Unsworth (2010), comparative case studies) that a state does not rely on its 
people to increase income. Besides, the allocation of resource supplies and mining rentals 
may have important effects on conflict and cause difficulties in stable society-to-peace co- 
existence (Collier (2006), DiJohn (2002), Le Billon (2012), Williams (2010)). 
Auty studied economics and geography, and he investigated the reasons why some 
resource-rich countries underperform and remain undeveloped in spite of the abundance of 
natural resources in the country as in the case of Nigeria. In other words, Auty defined the 
term natural resource curse as the perverse effects of a country’s natural resource wealth on 
the country’s economic, social, or political well-being (see Rose, 2014 Cited in Mehrdad, 
2017: 2). 
Azarhoushang and Rukavina (2014), and Mellissa (2017), in their respective studies 
of the resource curse theory, lumped the term with the Dutch Disease, an idiom used in 
association with a 1960 crisis in the Netherlands after the discovery of natural gas in the 
North Sea region of the country. They saw the phrase as the appropriate word to describe 
what happens when an event, like a commodity-boom, makes a country’s currency more 
expensive and its other goods less competitive. Akpotor (2016) stated that the Dutch Disease 
or Resource Curse theory is used to examine the negative effects that rich natural resources 
bring upon the economic growth of a resource rich country. To him, it is paradoxical for 
countries with the abundance of non-renewable natural resources to experience stagnant 
economic growth and contraction often associated with conflicts or crises of marginalization 
of the host community. For Duruji and Dibia (2017: 63), Resource curse is also known as 
the Paradox of Plenty and Moses Duruji, Okachikwu Dibia, 2017, describe the failure of 
many natural resource-rich nations to benefit fully from the wealth of their rich natural 
endowment following the inability of their governments to respond favorably and effectively 
to public welfares and needs. In a more elaborate manner, Azarhoushang and Rukavina 
(2014) argued that rich natural resources such as oil deposits and some significant others 
which are located in abundance in some countries have become a trap or a curse rather than 
being a blessing to the countries. The reason can be traced to the way and manner in which 
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the resources are managed right from the exploration stage by the multinational companies, 
through to the attitude of the home governments of the countries in which the resources are 
located, made worse by the activities of the local elite class as influenced by foreign and 
external forces of the developed nations of the world. According to Azarhoushang and 
Rukavina, the actions of these individuals and institutions have, in most cases, resulted in 
regular weak economic performance, the creation of long-lasting ineffective institutions, 
socioeconomic stagnancy and political backwardness, they argued. Venables (2016) argued 
that most of the oil-rich nations, rather than cultivate the culture of diversifying their 
economic system to a macroeconomic based system, they embrace a mono-economic policy 
which has resulted into over-reliance of crude oil exports which is detrimental to the 
country’s economic growth as evident in Nigeria. 
The oil industry must be regulated for many reasons. Each country has its oil and 
gas resources and access to them is required. For this to happen in an orderly manner, a state 
system and appropriate legislation are necessary. Other regulatory reasons are related to 
technology transfer, the need for security, the need for revenue control systems, and the need 
to protect the environment. If not governed by law, details related to these considerations are 
contained in the oil-exploration or production license contract and will generally replace 
existing regulations for this concession period. These agreements can indicate serious risks 
of corruption. For situations where government officials are required to follow the 
requirements laid down in the contract instead of in the law, the state's regulatory ability is 
likely to be reduced. Conflicts resulting from various Treaty definitions will be subject to 
international arbitration, not national court arbitration, which would mean decreased national 
power. Also, contract variations probably reflect the interests of individual firms that make 
government oversight difficult. In all cases, the regulation of the petroleum industry includes 
decision-making that is essential to government revenues and business income, and many 
players want to influence these decisions. 
How oil operations are regulated vary from country to country, as do the stages associated 
with oil exploration and production. Typically, regulatory regimes cover the licensing stage, 
the exploration, production or exploitation stage, and the post-production or 
decommissioning stage. Figure 5 shows typical regulatory stages of oil operations. Approval 
of the Field Development Plan (FDP), endorsement of the Final Plan, and endorsement of 
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the decommissioning step are the key steps. At any point in this process, incentives for 
corruption will occur as discussed below. 
Figure 5. Milestones in the relationship between government and licensees 
 
Source: Petroteam AS 
 
The literature review in this study also indicates that rich states are usually often more 
effective to manage, although causality has been hard to determine (for instance, whether 
countries are wealthy because they are better governed or better managed because they are 
wealthy). The typical collection of "good governance" (and corruption in particular) metrics 
are not related to the pace of growth (Meisel and Ould Aoudia, 2007). Short to medium-term 
differences in growth rates are not related to governance differences as the traditional "good 
governance" prescriptions, including corruption, understand (Williams et al., 2009). As 
Khan (2006) has demonstrated, there are no significant differences in governance quality in 
studies comparing more or less successful emerging economies. 
The petroleum sector is increasingly moving toward stronger host governments and 
national petroleum companies. Private oil firms, including the "seven sisters," are less likely 
in many countries to control or enforce working standards and are less likely to benefit 
financially. As per Robinson "Foreign firms are no longer running businesses.", PFC Energy 
President: "Western oil corporations are politicians, now. They manage the company. "There 
is significant uncertainty with big companies in the sector about their future profits, despite 
record-high oil prices. 
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Along with the sector's changing face, annual oil reserves are continuously lagging 
anticipated demand growth. Despite the knowledge, that the conventional petroleum 
resources of the world are dwindling and that they need to be used effectively, large 
quantities of petroleum will never come up as production in many countries is under optimal. 
To maximize early production, oil companies prefer quicker income generation. This can be 
achieved conveniently at the cost of greater oil recovery if resources were extracted over 
longer periods and with sufficient recovery steps. 
Significant contributions to the literature in the resource curse indicate that poor governance 
and corruption are key factors behind the large social divide in oil-producing countries. The 
broader debate is about the poor governance and corruption, the effects of revenue control 
and spending decisions, and the future benefits generated from oil. However, it has attracted 
little attention to how they affect the volumes of oil produced. This chapter brings together 
a study of the resource curse and petroleum production literature with qualitative findings 
from interviews with experts from the oil industry to understand how related corruption to 
oil production was below its potential. 
 
 
Table 2. Potential consequences for the regulation of oil. 
 
Oil 
politics 
and 
regulatory 
decisions 
Welfare- 
focused and 
honest 
government, 
no risk of 
corruption 
Welfare- 
focused 
government 
but risk of 
corruption in 
regulatory 
structures 
Corrupt 
political elite 
with short- 
term horizon. 
High 
prospectivity 
and 
production 
levels 
Government 
displays 
lack of 
capacity 
and 
competence 
Government 
under stress 
—poverty, 
civil unrest, 
instability at 
political 
levels, 
influence 
from energy- 
hungry 
foreign 
governments 
Crucial 
ambition 
(actual 
unofficial 
ambition) 
Environment 
al 
development: 
long-term 
The ambition 
is sustainable 
development, 
whilst the 
Incentives for 
short-term 
maximization 
of growth. 
The goal is 
sustainable 
growth, but 
actions that 
Avoid loss of 
power over 
develop ment 
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Table 2. Potential consequences for the regulation of oil (to be continued) 
 
behind oil 
production 
maximized 
profits 
reinvested in 
sustainable 
values. The 
effective 
institutions. 
Efficient 
institutions. 
Clear 
regulations 
and rules on 
petroleum. 
present 
regulation is 
different from 
good practice. 
Support 
based on 
populist 
arguments. 
Unclear 
legislation. 
do not 
fulfill that 
aim are 
made. 
politics 
and 
prevent 
coups. 
Using oil 
capital for 
limited 
strategic 
advantage 
s. Military 
financial 
update. 
Structures 
of 
ownership 
and 
legislation. 
Foreign entry 
welcome. 
Limited, 
separate 
regulatory 
and 
commercial 
functions of 
the national 
company 
authority. 
Without 
corresponding 
output, the 
national oil 
company is 
ambitious. 
International 
petroleum 
participation is 
being slowed 
down by 
bureaucracy. 
Powerful 
national 
petroleum 
company 
directly under 
President or 
Minister with 
the business 
role and 
regulatory 
control or 
regulatory 
functions. 
As 
regulators 
or 
bureaucratic 
supervision, 
the national 
oil company 
dominates. 
Divergence 
between 
planned and 
actual 
performanc 
e regulatory 
functions. 
Production 
superficial 
control. 
More 
vulnerabili 
ty in 
regulatory 
systems to 
corruption. 
Award of 
access to 
oil 
resources. 
Procedures 
and criteria 
clarity. Pre- 
qualifying. 
Bidding 
competitive. 
Discretion in 
accor- dance 
with 
assessment 
transparency 
Companies 
may access 
tendering 
criteria and 
procedures 
through undue 
influence. 
Operators 
accepted 
without the 
required 
Based on 
bonuses for 
signature. 
Round 
concept/aucti 
on – to 
promote fast 
start-ups. 
Poor 
incentives to 
invest in 
exploratory 
wells for 
Operators 
propose 
how to 
tender even 
if they are 
competitors 
themselves. 
he award 
process is 
used 
systematic 
ally, 
formally 
across 
rounds. 
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Table 2. Potential consequences for the regulation of oil (to be continued) 
 
 
  capacity. 
More need 
for track 
record data. 
drilling. 
Less focus 
on improved 
track record 
for 
recovery. 
  
Field Creating And if the FDP agrees Companies FDP may 
develop- communicatio desires of only if, have a greater be less 
ment plan n between the client irrespective negotiating important 
(FDP). licensees and were split, of the effect power in and 
 authorities. the FDPs on the relation to possibly 
 Maximized approved it. overall government left to the 
 complete Speedy recovery of and more regulatory 
 resource production capital, reservoir level, but 
 recovery at emphasis output is information. without the 
 optimum and less maximized For operators, support of 
 NPV. regeneration in the short FDP decisions higher 
  optimal. term. will reap big officials. 
  Local  benefits. In a  
  material  politically  
  unreasonabl  challenging  
  e requests.  situation.  
Overview Multi-angle Substantial Companies On-the-field Minimum 
and regulation (oil oversight of may reduce documentatio focus on 
control of authority, legislation. investments n and production 
production businesses, Manipulated and production monitoring 
. finance production optimize figures were . 
 ministry, figures. It's high limited to  
 central bank). hard to performance government  
 Revenue install or . Weak capacity.  
 control and audit a official Development  
 transparency. metering control. activities of  
  system. Weak operators and  
   official official  
   control. figures  
   Approval acknowledged  
   method .  
   Shallow   
   assessment.   
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Table 2. Potential consequences for the regulation of oil (to be continued) 
 
 
The tail- 
end game 
Companies 
dedicated to 
"tail-end 
production" 
have been 
invited. 
Tail-end 
development 
is less likely 
for 
operators. 
The 
ambiguity of 
the contract 
is prevalent 
in the 
movement. 
Output at 
tail-end is 
not a 
priority, but 
it is 
facilitated 
by 
decreasing 
cash flow. 
Limited 
understanding 
of how tail- 
end 
production 
solutions can 
be promoted. 
Authorities 
may not be 
completely 
aware of the 
probability of 
volume 
maximization 
or have little 
interest in it. 
Source: F. Al-Kasim et al. / Energy Policy 54 (2013) 137–147 
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II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The aim of the methodology part in this research is the specific procedures or techniques 
used to identify, select, process, and analyze information. At the beginning of this work 
presents methodology according to econometrics calculations. After was reviewed statistical 
data and presented several hypotheses that were formulated in accordance with the previous 
research. And was review the measurement of the corruption and the evolution of trade in 
oil exporting countries. 
2.1. The Ordinary Least Squares estimators and Poisson Pseudo- 
Maximum Likelihood estimators 
 
The technique in every study generally relates to the actions the researcher has 
taken to address the question that occurs in the research process. As this study is an economic 
analysis study focused on evaluating oil exports and the presence of corruption in countries 
and how it influences international trade, the econometric approach would be used to 
calculate or test foreign relation parameters focused on sample observations. The objective 
of the study is to determine the extent to which explaining variables affect the dependent 
variable over a certain number of years. 
We wanted to use a quantitative data collection approach for the research methodology. We 
will choose several countries for the estimation of the impact of corruption on trade in oil 
exporting countries and we will analyze their economy and how corruption affects the 
economy and the growth of the country in general. Selected for the analysis countries have 
a different level of corruption according to CPI (Corruption Perception Index) and these 
countries export oil (trading economics.com), also this part reviews techniques, which will 
be used to assess empirically the analysis between international trade and corruption in oil- 
exporting countries which effect on trade. To estimate the Augmented Gravity model, 
Robust Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood 
estimators, with and without fixed effects, will be used. All the calculations and estimations 
which will be written below will be provided with EViews software. 
Most papers investigating the effect of corruption on international commerce use the 
increased gravity model that derives its name from the analogy of Newtonian physics. As 
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we mentioned before, for the analysis of impact corruption in oil exporting countries we will 
use a gravity model. It was decided that the best method for working with international trade 
the gravity model because gravitational models of trade are one of the most important tools 
for empirical analysis of international and interregional trade flows. The first scholars who 
used the gravity equation to evaluate foreign trade movements were Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pöyhönen (1963). The gravity model has since grown into a common instrument of the 
scientific study of international exchange. This model has been successfully applied to 
movements of different types, including relocation, capital flows, and, more specifically, 
international trade. This model defines exports from the country i to the country j by their 
economic size (GDP or GNP), territorial ranges, demographics, and dummies collection, 
which combine some institutional features that are specific to similar flows. 
Originally there was very little scientific research maintenance in this field, but 
since the second half of the 1970s, many advancements in science have been advancing the 
principle of gravity. The first regular effort to create the gravity equation from a model that 
estimated the object differentiation was Anderson (1979). Bergstrand has discussed the 
empirical evaluation of bilateral trade in a series of papers (1985, 1989) in which the 
measurement of gravity is combined with simple models of monopoly rivalry. Helpman and 
Krugman (1985) used a distinct commodity structure to explain the gravity concept, with 
rising returns to scale. Deardorff (1995) showed that the gravity equation has many models 
and conventional exchange theories can describe them. Anderson and Wincoop (2001) have 
finally established a model of operational seriousness aimed at improving the CES system 
for expenditure that can be easily calculated and that helps to address the so-called limit 
issue. 
There is a large range of scientific applications in international trade literature that have led 
to improving gravity equation efficiency. Any of them contribute closer to our jobs. The 
econometric understanding of the gravity equation in the latest publications has been 
improved by Mátyás (1997) and (1998), Chen and Wall (1999), Breuss and Egger (1999), 
and Egger (2000). Secondly, the explanatory variables integrated in the analysis by adding 
new variables and, according to the general exchange gravity model, the number of exports 
between countries, Xij is the feature of the country 's incomes (GDPs); their population, 
among others, were Berstrand (1985), Helpman (1987), Wei (1996), Soloaga and Winches 
(1999), Limao and Venables (1999); and Bougheas et al (1999). 
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The basic augment gravity model: 
 
 
Xij=c+β1lnGDPi+ β2InGDPj+ β3InDistij+eij 
 
in conformity with Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano (2019), where ln denotes 
logarithm, i and j denote countries that have trading relationships. The variables below are: 
Xij are the bilateral export flows from country j to country j, GDPi, and GDPj reflect the 
country I and country j’s gross domestic product, Distij is the gap between the country I to 
country j. 
Withal, in this research, in addition from GDPs and Distance, we will use the 
following variables (which we will characterizein the following subsection): CONT is a 
dummy variable that equals zero if I and j have a boundary of the property, COMLANG is 
a dummy variable that is unitary if I and j have a common language. 
The augmented gravity model of international trade equation can be written as: 
 
Xij=β1InGDPi+ β2InGDPj+ β3InDistij+ β4CONTij+ β5InCOMLANGij+β6Corrupij+ 
β7Difcorrupij+ β8DIFFij+ β9REERi+REERj+λt+uijt 
where λt are time dummies and uijt is the standard classical error term (Gil-Pareja, Llorca- 
Vivero, Martínez-Serrano, 2019). 
Below the descriptions of the variables are described: 
Income [GDP]: Gross domestic product (GDP) is a nominal indicator of the total value of 
all the finished products and services generated for a specified period of time. 
Bilateral exports of oil [X]: Bilateral exports are the products and services that are 
manufactured in one nation and bought by citizens in another. 
Income per capita differential [DIFF]: This variable is described as the difference between 
the partner countries 'GDP per capita, added in order to detect a potential Linder effect. 
Bilateral exchange would be increasing, according to Linder's theorem, because the per 
capita GDPs of the exchanging countries are more comparable. 
Real effective exchange rate [REER]: The real effective exchange rate (REER) is the 
weighted average of a country's currency compared to another global currency index or set. 
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The weights are calculated by contrasting the currency of a nation's relative trading balance 
to each region inside the measure. 
Corruption index [CORRUP]: It is a country-pair corruption index (our interest variable). 
For the exporter, Corrupijt is the statistical calculation of the values of the related factors for 
abuse. That will provide us with an average amount of corruption that affects the same pair 
of countries. For the characteristics of the data in hand, we use the geometric mean because 
it is more suitable for CPI and CCI, since these indexes rate countries at the level of 
corruption. Hence, the geometric mean contributes less weight to the dramatic data values, 
Similarly with Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano (2019). 
Difference of corruption index [DIFCORRUP]: Analogously with Gil-Pareja, Llorca- 
Vivero, Martínez-Serrano (2019), it is an indicator of the distinction in the level of corruption 
in the country-pair. It is the total value to the exporter of the disparity of the corruption 
rankings. It shows us the "distance" between the pair of countries of rates of corruption. 
Horsewood and Voicu (2012) have found that trade is declining to the degree that the 
distinctions in this institutional characteristic are widening. We're going to check the finding 
with our study and different corruption interventions. 
Common border [CONT]: This value shows the common border between the pair of 
countries, likewise with Gil-Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano (2019). 
Initially, combined Ordinary Least Squares determined the gravity equations. Since 
the 2000s, though, some important articles also outlined several related aspects that needed 
to be taken into consideration in calculating equations of gravity in order to prevent problems 
of misspecification issues.Egger (2002) points to the need to control certain causes of 
countries-pairs that effect their joint trade but are unchanged over time (unobservable 
bilateral heterogeneity). This is explained by including fixed state pair effects (CPFE) in the 
panel data set. Apart from this, the fixed effects of an incomprehensible pair are correctly 
controlled by the main informants of endogeneity (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, or Gil- 
Pareja, Llorca-Vivero, Martínez-Serrano, 2019). It is indisputable that the effects of 
dynamic variables of the country-pair in the two-way fixed effects are reported in the 
distance, the common language, etc. 
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The most commonly used procedure used for regression analysis is called The Ordinary 
leastsquares (OLS). In statistics, ordinary least squares (OLS) are the variety of linear least- 
squares method used to estimate unidentified parameters in a linear regression model. OLS 
selects the parameters of a linear function of a series of explanatory variables by the theory 
of the least-squares: to minimize the sum of the squares of the discrepancies between the 
observed dependent variable (values of the variable being measured) in the given dataset and 
those expected by the linear function. 
If the classical weight estimate assumptions are fulfilled, the Ordinary Least Squares 
Estimator (OLSE) is the strongest linear regression process. If these premises are broken, 
the strict approaches produce more exact predictions when the OLSE is seriously negatively 
affected. In statistics, ordinary least squares (OLS) is a sort of linear least-squares approach 
used to approximate uncertain variables in a linear regression. OLS selects the parameters 
of a linear function of a series of explanatory variables by the theory of the least-squares: to 
reduce the sum of the squares of the variations between the observable dependent variable 
(values of the variable being measured) in the specified dataset and those expected by the 
linear feature. 
Geometrically, this is defined as the sum of the square deviations between each data point 
in the collection and the corresponding point on the correlation sheet, parallel to the axis of 
the dependent variable – the smaller the variations, the more the model matches the results. 
From the theoretical regression model: 
Yi= β0+β1+Xi+ɛi 
where Y is the value of dependent variable, β0, is the intercept of the model, X i corresponds 
to the ith explanatory variable of the model (i= 1), and ɛ is the random error with expectation 
0. 
It can be estimated regression equation 
 
 
?̂?i= ?̂? +?̂? 
 
Xi. 
OLS  is  a  technique  that  is  used  to  obtain?̂?0 and?̂? 
 
. The OLS method corresponds to 
minimizing the sum of square differences between the observed and predicted values. The 
OLS procedure minimizes 
0 1 
1 
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0 
𝑛 2 𝑛 𝑛 ̂ ̂ 2 
∑
?̇?=1 
𝑒𝑖 = ∑𝑖=1(𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖)=∑ (𝑦𝑖 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1 − 𝑋𝑖) 
𝑖=1 
with  respect  to?̂?0 and?̂? . Solving the minimization problem results in the following 
expressions: 
 
∑
𝑛 
 
(𝑋 −𝑋̅)(𝑦 −𝑦̅) 
𝑛 
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∑
𝑛 (𝑋 −𝑋̅)2 ∑
𝑛 𝑋2−𝑛𝑋̃2 
𝑖=1    𝑖 𝑖=1   𝑖 
 
 
Beta equals to covariance between Y and X divided by the variance of X. 
?̂? = 𝑦̃ − ?̂? 𝑋̃ 
Different datasets will produce different values for?̂? and?̂? 
In order for OLS regression to work properly, your data should fit several 
assumptions (from the University of Oxford’s list): 
• The model should have linear parameters. 
• The data should be a random sample from the population. In other words, 
the residuals should not be connected or correlated to each other in any way. 
• The independent variables should not be strongly collinear. 
• The residuals’ expected value is zero. 
• The residuals have homogeneous variance. 
• The residuals follow a normal distribution. 
• The independent variables have been measured accurately (if they aren’t, small errors 
in measurement could result in huge errors for your OLS regression). 
 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) propose the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
as a pragmatic solution to both problems. The Poisson regression model is defined in 
general terms by the discrete distribution. The Poisson estimator has many suitable 
properties for the usage of gravity models in practical policy analysis. First, the inclusion of 
defined results is reliable, and can be entering as dummy variables similar with basic OLS. 
The argument is an especially relevant one for gravity modeling since most theory-consistent 
models allow the exporters and importers to have defined effects. 
In accordance with Shepherd, B., Doytchinova, H. S. & Kravchenko, A. (2019) the Poisson 
estimator is becoming increasingly common in the literature, but is not clear of divergent 
views. Applied researchers should be aware of some of the issues found with the Poisson 
1 
0 
1 
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estimator and the resulting additional characteristics. On the one side, in place of Poisson, 
some researchers used alternative calculate data methods, such as the negative binomial 
model, under the basis that exchange data is prone to show over-dispersion (variance greater 
than mean). This strategy, however, is incorrect for two factors. Poisson is reliable as a 
pseudo-maximum estimator of likelihood no matter whether the results are currently spread. 
In terms of performance, the only change that might come from having over-dispersion 
would. Therefore, in order for the finding benefits to be true, the exact essence of the 
overdispersion will need to be understood because it is not ordinarily. 
Second, the Poisson estimator obviously contains results in terms to which the measured 
commercial significance is zero. These results are removed from the OLS model as it does 
not define the logarithm of zero. However, they are quite normal in the exchange network, 
since not all countries deal with all suppliers for all goods (Haveman & Hummels, 2004). 
Although the problem has emerged primarily in the form of fair exchange to date, it is still 
applicable to the exchange of services. In recent scientific research, decreasing zero results 
in the manner OLS does theoretically contributes to sample selection bias, which has become 
a major problem. So Poisson's potential to make zero findings automatically and without 
applying anything to the simple model is extremely beneficial. While the effects of a model 
of dollar trade as the dependent variable would be different from those obtained as the 
dependent variable for trade in millions of dollars. This function of the negative binomial 
model in its normal environment of count data is not troublesome, however, is troubling in 
the case of gravity modeling. So in reality, practical researchers can oppose the negative 
binomial rule. A second resolution was released that other estimators may be superior to 
Poisson because a huge number of zeros is given by the observed exchange matrix. 
Third, it is easy to view the Poisson model coefficients and follow the same pattern as for 
OLS. The coefficient of independent variables in logarithms can still be viewed as a simple 
elasticity, even when the Poisson Regression dependent variable is specified as exports at 
levels rather than logarithms. The solution to this problem, however, is similar to the 
previous one: Poisse is consistent irrespective of how the results are actually transmitted, 
which means that the zero and the non-zero measurements generated by the identical method 
of producing evidence. Recent tests (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2011 ) indicate in any case 
that Poisson performs very well even in datasets with large numbers of zeros. 
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Bringing both references, down there a good case with Poisson as the estimator of the 
workhorse pattern of gravity. From the point of view of integrated policy analysis, Poisson's 
favorable properties indicate that projections of policy impacts will typically be focused on 
findings from Poisson rather than OLS. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) apply a benchmark 
to determine if the OLS estimator is acceptable, and another test to determine if Poisson or 
different estimators of pseudo-maximum probability is likely to be accurate. A thorough 
description of such measures, though, is out of the reach of the existing customer manual. In 
either case, Poisson tests should constantly be viewed for comparison objectives as a 
robustness check. 
Table 3. List and observations of the methodologies for scientific studies 
 
Year Author Research Methodology Major findings 
2019 Salvador 
Gil- 
Pareja, 
Rafael 
Llorca- 
Vivero, 
José 
Antonio 
Martíne 
z-   
Serrano 
Corruption and 
international trade: a 
comprehensive 
analysis with gravity 
The gravity 
model 
The findings show that 
corruption has a negative 
impact on trade with 
CCI. However, the use of 
SCI has a positive 
impact. Corruption 
adversely affects trade 
between countries with 
high and low incomes. 
2010 Odularu Impact of crude oil 
production on 
Nigeria economic 
growth 
Ordinary Least 
square and Cobb- 
Douglas 
production 
function 
Crude oil production led 
to industrial growth in 
Nigeria but was not 
dramatically enhancing 
economic efficiency. 
2007 Akanni Does Oil Exporting 
Countries grows as 
their earnings on oil 
rents increases 
Ordinary least 
square (OLS) 
The oil rent has a 
favorable association 
with economic 
development in oil 
exporting countries 
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Table 3. List and observations of the methodologies for scientific studies (to be continued) 
 
 
2005 Idowu Linkage 
between oil 
exports 
And Nigeria's 
economic 
development 
Johansen 
Multivariate 
co-integration 
technique 
Strong export- 
to- 
GDP partnership 
1993,1995,1996 Murphy 
Mandapaka 
Triole 
Relationship 
between 
corruption and 
economic 
growth 
OLS 2-Stage 
least square 
(Economic 
growth 
approach) 
The  adverse 
association 
between 
corruption and 
development 
could only  be 
proved 
empirically by a 
few. 
1995, 1998 
1999, 2000 
Tumovsky Jain 
Stapenhurst 
Hammond 
Effectiveness 
of some 
proposed 
solutions to 
combat 
corruption 
SWARM 
(Simulation 
approach) 
Many 
demonstrated 
the strength of 
the partnership 
between 
corruption and 
growth impact 
trigger results. 
1991,1992,1995 Andvig Laffont 
Basu 
Mookherjee 
Conditions 
necessary for 
corruption and 
those that  is 
conducive to it. 
One stage 
Game 
This method 
offers some 
valuable 
perspectives on 
the concept of 
abuse. 
 
 
2.2 The measurement of corruption 
 
The relation between the huge oil reserves and confusion, sometimes followed by 
internal pressure or wars, is a reality acknowledged by the scientists. In certain areas of the 
planet, oil reserves are closely related to the battles for dominance of oil production, and to 
the intervention of major powers in wars arising from oil searches. From all this comes the 
answer to the question, how does corruption occurs? In the pursuit of money and power, 
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especially in countries where oil is produced, people are willing to break the law to get this 
power, thereby illegally obtaining these riches. 
The part of the analysis of corruption presents a list of countries that will be used for the 
estimation of impact corruption on trade in oil exporting countries. Two indexes are 
commonly used to research corruption in countries: The Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 
and the Control of Corruption Index (CCI). These two steps will be applied below. 
1. In accordance with Fouladi M., Goodarzi Farahani Y. and Setayesh H. (2014) the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) focuses on public sector corruption and describes 
corruption as the abuse of public authority for the gain of society. Surveys used to assemble 
the database contain queries about, for example, public official bribery. Index validity (CPI) 
is specific in various nations, which relies on the number of sources of evidence used to 
determine corruption rates. For each year, the calculation of the Corruption Perception Index 
is based on the details correlated with both the particular year and the year previous. The 
Index ranks countries and territories on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
It is necessary to remember that the relevant "grade" will be regarded in order to measure 
corruption in each country; the explanation is that a country's CPI-based "rating" the adjust 
simply as new countries join the index or certain countries can drop out. 
2. The Regulation of Corruption Index (CCI) is an aggregate of multiple metrics that quantify 
the degree to which public authority is exerted for private benefit, covering both small and 
broad types of corruption, as well as elite and private-interest "capture" of governance. This 
index varies from -2.5 (for very low performance) to + 2.5 (for results excellent), similar 
with Fouladi M., Goodarzi Farahani Y. and Setayesh H. (2014). 
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Figure 6. Corruption Perception Index 2019 
 
 
Source: www.transparency.org/cpi 
 
Table 4. Corruption Perceptions Index 2019 Global Scores 
 
 
Country 
CPI 
score 
2019 
 
Rank 
Standard 
error 
Number 
of sources 
Lower 
CI 
Upper 
CI 
Brazil 35 106 4,06 8 28,34 41,66 
China 41 80 2,10 8 37,55 44,45 
Iraq 20 162 2,98 5 15,11 24,89 
Kazakhstan 34 113 4,18 9 27,15 40,85 
Kuwait 40 85 1,88 6 36,92 43,08 
Libya 18 168 2,24 5 14,32 21,68 
Mexico 29 130 1,73 9 26,17 31,83 
Russia 28 137 2,48 9 23,94 32,06 
United Arab Emirates 71 21 5,13 8 62,59 79,41 
Venezuela 16 173 2,05 8 12,64 19,36 
Source: www.transparency.org/cpi 
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Table 4 illustrates 10 countries with different score of corruption level. All these countries 
exporting oil and for our estimation of impact corruption on trade in oil exporting countries 
we choose countries with a different level, there are countries with a high level as Venezuela 
and Libya, and with a lower level of corruption as an example with United States Emirates. 
2.3 The evolution of trade in oil exporting countries 
 
Over the past decades, the oil industry has become a major factor in the 
development of the world economy and international relations. The situation on the world 
oil market is changing rapidly, and international problems caused by the struggle of various 
forces for the possession of this unique strategic commodity are constantly causing a wide 
resonance around the world. Analysis of the global oil market is essential for understanding 
the nature and direction of global development, both in general and for individual countries. 
Naturally, oil production has a significant impact on the development of the entire world 
economy. Large commodity oil production, being concentrated in a relatively small number 
of countries and mostly in the hands of large state organizations or private monopolies, is an 
important geostrategic factor in the world economy and politics, and large producing 
countries come together for a coordinated influence on the market. 
Oil revenues are most important in the countries that are members of the 
Organization of petroleum exporting countries (they account for up to 60% of all export 
revenues). As we know, the Organization of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) was 
formed in 1960. This organization, which became the commodity Association of 
independent sovereign oil-producing States, includes Algeria, Angola, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Later, this 
list was supplemented by other countries. The unofficial format of OPEC+ was formed in 
November 2016, due to the dissatisfaction of many oil-producing countries with prices on 
the world oil market. As of April 2020, the OPEC+ cartel includes 10 countries — 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Russia, Sudan, and 
South Sudan (according to information of Wikipedia, the key producer and informal leader 
of the cartel is Russia, with 14% of world oil production). To regulate oil prices on the world 
market, OPEC has resorted to the cartel-specific method of quotas, i.e. setting an individual 
maximum oil production volume for each participating country. 
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Table 5. Crude oil production by country 
 
Countries Last Previous Reference Unit 
Brazil 
3107 3090 Dec/19 BBL/D/1K 
China 3782 3820 Dec/19 BBL/D/1K 
Iraq 4500 4500 Mar/20 BBL/D/1K 
Kazakhstan 1949 1937 Dec/19 BBL/D/1K 
Kuwait 2901 2665 Mar/20 BBL/D/1K 
Libya 93 147 Mar/20 BBL/D/1K 
Mexico 1734 1726 Dec/19 BBL/D/1K 
Russia 10871 10853 Dec/19 BBL/D/1K 
United Arab Emirates 3526 2990 Mar/20 BBL/D/1K 
Venezuela 718 865 Mar/20 BBL/D/1K 
Source: tradingeconomics.com 
 
Table 5 provides values for Crude Oil Production reported in observing 10 countries. The 
table has current values for Crude Oil Production, previous releases, historical highs and 
record lows. 
Table 6. GDP per capita by country in 2018 
 
Countries Last Previous Reference Unit 
Brazil 
11026 10990 Dec/18 USD 
China 7755 7308 Dec/18 USD 
Iraq 5511 5605 Dec/18 US 
Kazakhstan 11166 10868 Dec/18 USD 
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Table 6. GDP per capita by country in 2018 (to be continued) 
 
Kuwait 33538 33790 Dec/18 USD 
Libya 7529 7086 Dec/18 USD 
Mexico 10385 10298 Dec/18 USD 
Russia 11729 11470 Dec/18 USD 
United Arab 
Emirates 
40782 40819 Dec/18 USD 
Venezuela 16054 12457 Dec/18 USD 
Source: tradingeconomics.com 
 
Table 6 presents data of Gross Domestic Product, which allows us to understand and analyze 
an economic condition of the chosen for observing 10 countries. As we can see from the 
table the highest GDP per capita in Venezuela and the lowest in Iraq. The table has current 
values for GDP per capita, previous releases, historical highs and record lows, release 
frequency, reported unit. 
According to the information provided by OPEC the global economic development and 
demographic expansion have fueled a precipitous increase in oil demand for decades, adding 
a cumulative 75 mb/d since the 1960s. That said, oil demand has declined on an annual basis 
on different occasions, most recently in 2008-09. Previously, oil demand recorded y-o-y 
annual declines in the early 1980s for nearly four consecutive years with a cumulative drop 
of around 6 mb/d. Those declines were a response to slowing economic activity in industrial 
countries owing to the oil crisis of the 1970s, and the energy conservation encouraged by 
relatively high retail fuel prices. 
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Figure 7. Total oil demand in the world since 1960 to 2020 
 
 
 
Source: OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) 
 
The current global situation, driven by the onset of COVID-19 at the beginning of the year 
in China and elsewhere in the world by March 2020, appears to represent a perfect storm of 
oil demand destruction. Restrictions on mobility almost everywhere have constrained 
transportation fuel demand in the current year. For now, oil demand is projected to return to 
growth in 2021 
An unbalanced energy market, primarily oil, is a major threat to the global economy. The 
lack of clarity on oil prices negatively affects economic development plans. It is clear that 
exorbitant oil prices, as well as very low ones, are unprofitable for both producers and 
consumers. It is important to understand that oil prices serve as a benchmark for pricing of 
other energy, and influence economic and political processes that determine the stock price 
of oil companies, the speed of their economic growth and the level inflation in the countries 
– importers of oil, and intensity of the processes of centralization and concentration of 
production. 
2.4 Research hypothesis 
 
Based on the literature review that was presented above, we have suggested the following 
hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1. High level of corruption in oil-exporting countries, can affect economic 
growth and bilateral trade. The impact of corruption on a country's economic growth is 
directly related to trade relations between countries. To support trade relations, investments 
are needed, which may flow out of the state budget during the development of corruption in 
the field of oil exports. 
Hypothesis 2. The high level of corruption in the oil exporting countries may reduce the 
effectiveness of international trade. If corruption occurs in the oil exporting region, the level 
of exports may decrease. This may be due to a number of reasons: increasing prices in order 
to increase revenue, but not taking into account the prices of competitors. In this case, the 
buyer can enter into an agreement with another country. The second reason may be a desire 
to enter into a contract illegally. The buyer's country will refuse in this case based on the fact 
that it will be illegal. 
Hypothesis 3. . Positive influence of the real effective exchange rate on the development of 
international trade in the oil sector. This hypothesis considers the possibility of the impact 
of the real effective exchange rate on the development of international trade to the positive 
side. 
Following the above hypotheses, an econometric analysis will be performed to test these 
hypotheses using the gravitational model, OLS, and PPML for further analysis of the 
obtained data. All the results obtained in this work concerning hypotheses will be presented 
in the next part of the study 
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III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In this section, we will provide information about the results of the assessment. The collected 
data, which were analyzed and conducted a number of studies, will show us the results of 
our assumptions and hypotheses. This section provides data from the EViews program for 
estimation and calculation of the gravitational model. To analyze the impact of corruption 
on trade in oil exporting countries, was done to work with a selected list of ten countries. In 
our case, we will check the main variables as CORRUPij and Difcorrupij, and also other 
variables as well as the remaining values between Kazakhstan and the other nine selected 
countries. 
3.1. Results 
 
 
The dataset consists from the annual data for Real GDP, Real Effective Exchange 
Rate, Bilateral exports, Income per capita differential (DIFF), Corruption index (CORRUP), 
Difcorrup, Common border (CONT), Distance between i and j countries, Trade in 10 
(Kazakhstan, Russian, China, Mexico, Venezuela, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, 
Iraq, Brazil) oil exporting countries for the period of 2000-2018. Top oil exporting countries 
were selected based on the market share in the world market. The data description and 
sources are described in the table below. 
Table 7. The data description and sources 
 
№ Variable name Description of the variable Expected 
signs 
Source 
1 Bilateral exports 
(Xij) 
Bilateral exports in current 
USD 
 Global Economic 
Data, Indicators, 
Charts& Forecasts 
2 GDP GDP of the countries i and 
jin current USD 
Positive/ 
Negative 
World Bank 
3 REER Real Effective Exchange 
Rate based on CPI 
Positive/ 
Negative 
Brent UK 
4 DIST Distance between i and j 
countries 
Negative World Bank 
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Table 7. The data description and sources (to be continued) 
 
 
5 CORRUPij Index of corruption Negative World Bank 
6 DIFCORRUPij Difference between Cori 
and corj 
Positive World Bank 
7 DIFFij Trade (% of GDP) Positive World Bank 
8 CONTij common land border Positive Dummy variable 
9 COMLANGij common language between 
countries 
Positive Dummy variable 
 
The product of GDP of Kazakhstan and 9 countries in time t used as a measure of 
economic size. This variable is expected to be positively and significantly related to trade. 
Gross domestic product of 9 countries and Kazakhstan are obtained from the World Bank, 
both of them are in US current dollars and converted into constant US price of 2000 using 
the GDP deflator given by WB. 
Empirical studies found that exchange rates are important in the interpretation of 
trade differences between participating states in addition to the gravity equation 
(Bergstand,1985 and Dell Ariccia, 1999). The exchange rate is also included in the model as 
an illustrating variable. The nominal exchange rate shall be calculated by an annual average 
of ten countries per dollar per national currency unit, divided by one Kazakhstan National 
Monetary Unit per dollar per annum. Data of the exchange rate for both 9 countries and 
Kazakhstan are obtained from the World Bank and the Global Economic Data, Indicators, 
Charts& Forecasts. Source: [https://www.ceicdata.com/datapage/en/indicator/real- 
effective-exchange-rate]. 
 
The effect on bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and nine countries of real exchange 
rate variables is likely to be negative. Currency appreciation in Kazakhstan reflects a rise in 
the actual exchange rate, which would result in costly exports and cheaper imports. The 
former effects of Kazakhstan 's trade relations with nine countries seem reasonable to 
presume, or the increase of the real exchange rate leads to a decrease in bilateral trade. This 
is because Kazakhstan has a long-term surplus with nine countries and most exports from 
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Kazakhstan are labor-intensive, while imports are capital-intensive, so exports are most 
vulnerable to market price fluctuations. 
The distance is calculated in kilometers between Nursultan capital city and the capital 
of the other countries as the transport costs proxy between Kazakhstan and 9 countries. Data 
about distance is taken from a wide circle between capitals, where distance as the minimum 
distance along the earth's surface is measured. It is predicted that this variable would have a 
detrimental impact on trade with the increased costs of transport over distances. 
We are employing 2 major corruption measures for this measure of general in the 
study: The Corruption Perception Index (CORRUPij) as the indicator of corruption and 
Difcorrupij as the absolute value of the difference between the export and import indexes. 
This gives us the "distance" between the two countries in corruption. In this regard, 
Horsewood and Voicu (2012) find that the trade in this institutional characteristic increases 
as far as the differences are reduced. With our sample and various corruption measures, we 
will test this result. The difference between GDP per capita i and j in the region, as 
determined by our chart, is by capital differential income (DIFF). 
The contiguity (CONTij) is a variable of the dummy that takes 0 in case the associates 
have a common border, and 1 differently. The common language (COMLANGij) variable is 
a binary variable that takes value 1 when common languages exist in countries and 0. 
Bilateral export estimates from Kazakhstan to 9 countries are presented in Table 8. 
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Table 8. Results using OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 7.221395 6.881101 1.049454 0.2956 
LOG(GDPi) 1.061292 0.261024 4.065876 0.0001 
LOG(GDPj) 0.169627 0.118837 1.427398 0.1554 
REERi 0.001266 0.017995 0.070354 0.9440 
REERj -0.008691 0.007256 -1.197759 0.2328 
LOG(DISTij) -0.181316 0.802506 -0.225938 0.8215 
DIFFij 4.87E-05 2.92E-05 1.666755 0.0975 
DIFCORRUPij -0.071355 0.035334 -2.019466 0.0451 
CORRUPij 0.086021 0.074404 1.156142 0.2493 
CONTij -8.133724 1.043050 -7.798020 0.0000 
COMLANGij 2.181459 0.657148 3.319587 0.0011 
R-squared 0.742587 Mean dependent var 8.295497 
Adjusted R- 
squared 
0.726499 S.D. dependent var 4.802234 
S.E. of 
regression 
2.511440 Akaike info criterion 4.741755 
Sum squared 
resid 
1009.173 Schwarz criterion 4.943850 
Log likelihood -394.4201 F-statistic 46.15696 
Durbin-Watson 
stat 
0.857771 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
Notes: Sample period: 2000-2018. Dependent variable: log of bilateral exports (C). 
Tkr = (0,05; n-k-1) = (0,05; 159) = 1,66→5% 
Log(GDPi), DIFFij, DIFCORRUPij, CONTij, COMLANGij are significant at 5%. 
 
 
The results for the estimations of the gravity equation of corruption considered are in 
the Table 8. As normal, about 74% of the variability in bilateral trade flows is well explained 
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by the OLS calculation for the gravity equation. Trade flows are projected to increase with 
national revenues and decrease with distance. The remaining variables with small exceptions 
depending on the sample of the increased gravitational equation are, in General, sensible and 
have no significant coefficients. The OLS method shows that trade equations are accurate, 
approximate coefficients with almost all the anticipated signs. 
The regression coefficient of GDPi (Kazakhstan) is 1.061 with positive value. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the GDPi variable has a significant effect on Kazakhstan’s export 
value to 9 destination countries. While GDPj variable (9 importing countries) has also 
positive coefficient 0.169 and partially has a probability value of 1.43 (1.43 < 1.66), thus 
GDPj has no significant effect on Kazakhstan’s export value to 9 destination countries. 
As a price competitiveness variable, the real effective exchange rates in the i country 
have a positive effect on trade flows. The exchange rate of the exporting country indicates 
that the exporting country's weakening of its currency has an important and positive effect 
on its exports. REERj has a negative sign on the other hand. 
The distance as a transportation cost proxy is negative and not significant at a level 
of 5 percent. The contij also provides a negative and meaningful coefficient that shows the 
presence of common borders. Common language is a positive but not important that suggests 
that countries may increase trade flows while they have different languages. 
With respect to corruption variables, both export and import trade flows have a 
positive impact on the interpretation of corruption indexes. The exporting country's decrease 
in corruption boosts trade. A decrease in corruption on the part of the importer would lead 
to an increase in the volume of trade. 
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Figure 8 – Time effects of trade between Kazakhstan and other 9 countries 
 
Figure 9 plots the time effects of bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and the other 
countries, these effects are all individually significant. Kazakhstan’s trade with other 9 
countries has increased substantially from 2000 to 2018. After 2000 until recently the 
bilateral trade, however, has a tendency to decrease. The recession can be explained from 
the world crisis which occurred in 2008 and 2014 and it should be noted that the OLS method 
has coefficients that are not significant this is due to the fact that many variables were 
included in the model and then collinearity may appear between the variables, also in the 
second method PPML z statistical has too large numbers this also became suspicious. Now 
let's try to eliminate some variables in order to correct our model. To do this, create a 
correlation table that shows exactly the variables that need to be removed. 
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Table 9. Correlation matrix 
 
 
  
COMLANGij 
 
CONTij 
 
CORRUPij 
 
DIFCORRUPij 
 
DIFFij 
 
DISTij 
 
GDPi 
 
GDPj 
 
REERi 
 
REERj 
 
Xij 
COMLANGij 1 -0.377 0.394 -0.400 -0.332 -0.590 3.028 -0.163 -1.932 0.490 0.295 
CONTij -0.377 1 0.052 -0.092 -0.253 0.608 3.469 0.130 -3.287 -0.162 -0.764 
 
CORRUPij 
 
0.394 
 
0.052 
 
1 
 
-0.890 
 
-0.691 
 
-0.034 
 
0.105 
 
0.115 
 
-0.004 
 
0.489 
 
0.040 
 
DIFCORRUPij 
 
-0.400 
 
-0.092 
 
-0.890 
 
1 
 
0.757 
 
0.054 
 
0.063 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.016 
 
-0.444 
 
0.016 
 
DIFFij 
 
-0.332 
 
-0.253 
 
-0.691 
 
0.757 
 
1 
 
0.219 
 
0.067 
 
-0.110 
 
0.028 
 
-0.290 
 
0.221 
 
DISTij 
 
-0.590 
 
0.608 
 
-0.034 
 
0.054 
 
0.219 
 
1 
- 
1.344 
 
0.125 
 
6.152 
 
-0.163 
 
-0.453 
GDPi 3.028 3.469 0.105 0.063 0.067 -1.344 1 -0.117 0.348 0.161 0.226 
 
GDPj 
 
-0.163 
 
0.130 
 
0.115 
 
-0.155 
 
-0.110 
 
0.125 
- 
0.117 
 
1 
 
0.004 
 
0.244 
 
-0.187 
 
REERi 
 
-1.932 
 
-3.287 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.016 
 
0.028 
 
6.152 
 
0.348 
 
0.004 
 
1 
 
0.079 
 
0.086 
 
REERj 
 
0.490 
 
-0.162 
 
0.489 
 
-0.444 
 
-0.290 
 
-0.163 
 
0.161 
 
0.244 
 
0.079 
 
1 
 
0.211 
 
Xij 
 
0.295 
 
-0.764 
 
0.040 
 
0.016 
 
0.221 
 
-0.453 
 
0.226 
 
-0.187 
 
0.086 
 
0.211 
 
1 
 
A correlation matrix is a table showing correlation coefficients between variables. 
Each cell in the table shows the correlation between two variables. A correlation matrix is 
used to summarize data, as an input into a more advanced analysis, and as a diagnostic for 
advanced analyzes, indirect signs of multicollinearity are high standard errors in model 
parameter estimates, small t-statistics (meaning that coefficients are insignificant), and 
incorrect marks of estimates, even though the model as a whole is recognized as statistically 
significant (a large value of F-statistics). Multicollinearity can also be indicated by a strong 
change in parameter estimates from adding (or deleting) sample data (if the requirements for 
sufficient sample uniformity are met). To detect multicollinearity of factors, the correlation 
matrix of factors can be analyzed directly. The presence of large modulus values (above 0.7- 
0.8) of the pair correlation coefficients indicates possible problems with the quality of the 
obtained estimates. 
There is a collinearity between the variables DIFCORRUPij  and CORRUPij-0.890 > 
0.7. also, DIFCORRUPij and DIFFij 0.757>0.7. An ongoing debate about estimating 
techniques  has  been  generated  by  the  expanded  use  of  the  gravity  models  to predict 
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international commercial flows. In particular, there is controversy about zero-commercial 
and heterogeneous residues. Both of these problems also concern models of gravity used to 
simulate other behavior that echo gravitational interactions in social sciences. 
Next, we consider heteroscedasticity in the OLS model using the white test that 
presented in Annex 2. As can be seen from the table, our model has a heteroscedastic since, 
test statistic is significant, P value< 5%. 
In the past several years Poisson has gained more popularity in addressing these estimate 
problems, together with pseudo-maximum likelihood methods. This method is robust for 
multiple trends, and it is also a reasonable way to resolve the zero question in the data on 
trade flows. We argue that the estimation by PPML of model parameters leads to clear but 
partial estimations of parameters when the spatial correlation between flows of origin and 
purpose is ignored. We suggest separate spatial filtration variants of the Poisson gravity 
model along with the pseudo maximum likelihood calculation to resolve this estimation. 
Table 10. Estimation Results of PPML (Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
Constant 5.323852 0.009538 558.1453 0.0000 
REERj -0.008811 9.49E-06 -928.3030 0.0000 
REERi 0.000339 6.80E-06 49.87126 0.0000 
LOG(GDPj) 0.088785 5.65E-05 1571.573 0.0000 
LOG(GDPi) 1.074727 0.000267 4025.609 0.0000 
LOG(DISTij) 0.269936 0.001035 260.8430 0.0000 
DIFFij 1.24E-05 4.02E-08 308.0238 0.0000 
DIFCORRUPij -0.036368 1.94E-05 -1878.645 0.0000 
CORRUPij -0.016550 3.74E-05 -442.2068 0.0000 
CONTij -5.421505 0.001552 -3492.730 0.0000 
COMLANGij 3.803913 0.004246 895.9735 0.0000 
R-squared 0.921932 Mean dependent var 1180881. 
Adjusted R- 
squared 
 
0.917053 
 
S.D. dependent var 
 
2831590. 
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Table 10. Estimation Results of PPML (Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood), to be 
continued 
 
S.E. of regression 815514.2 Akaike info criterion 144086.0 
Sum squared resid 1.06E+14 Schwarz criterion 144086.2 
Log likelihood -12319346 Hannan-Quinn criter. 144086.1 
Restr. log 
likelihood 
 
-3.36E+08 
 
Avg. log likelihood 
 
-72042.96 
LR statistic (10 df) 6.48E+08 LR index (Pseudo-R2) 0.963352 
Probability(LR 
stat) 
 
0.000000 
   
 
 
As for the second method, it is more plausible, that is, we will get the values of the 
model parameters that make the data "closer" to the real one. The results of Table 10 are 
therefore our preferred results. As far as we know, this is the first paper, which estimates 
both the effects on trade of corruption in the light of all the linked sources of possible bias 
and uses the corruption index. The Poisson estimator is increasingly popular in literature, 
but it is not free of differences. Applied researchers need to consider some of the issues 
found with respect to the Poisson estimator, and the resulting additional characteristics. 
The GDP of Kazakhstan and the other countries in this model is also very low, but it 
is positive and significant. As in the first model, the distance has a negative sign. Difcorrupij 
and the corruption index also have a negative sign. Income per capital differential (DIFF) is 
positive and statistically significant. The dummy variables Contij and Comlangij are positive 
and negative. 
Therefore, we have to be able to understand why the difference in estimates is as high 
as they are, how heteroscedasticity is patterned, and why an especially big prediction for this 
particular sample will occur. Remember that in the special case where OLS error term (ijt) 
is homoscedastic, OLS estimates are consistent. The use of what Tukey (1977) calls a 
"transparent system" is a helpful way of visualizing how far away from the data is from 
fulfilling this statement. 
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Table 11. Results using OLS and PPML (Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood) from 
2005 to 2018 
 
Variables OLS St. error PPML St. error 
Log(C (Xij)) -2.504 7.702 12.071 0.004 
COMLANGij 3.348 0.725 3.412 0.004 
CONTij -8.313 1.172 -4.915 0.001 
CORRUPij 0.061 0.085 -0.017 3.520 
DIFCORRUPij -0.096 0.041 -0.043 1.810 
DIFFij 7.190 2.820 3.260 3.340 
Log(DISTij) 0.656 0.840 -1.450 1.940 
Log(GDPi) 1.988 0.600 0.007 2.310 
Log(GDPj) 0.101 0.130 0.0003 4.860 
REERi -0.006 0.017 -0.002 7.210 
REERj -0.020 0.007 -0.003 8.330 
Observations 117 117 
R2 0.78 0.91 
Notes: Sample period: 2005-2018. 
Calculations for the 2005-2018 sample reports traditional results. For example, 
GDP positively and significantly affects trade flows. REERi and REERj still negatively and 
significantly affect export flows. For Diffij it has positive and significant coefficients for both 
exporting and importing countries. The GDPi has a positive and significant effect on exports 
for the exporting country, while it has a negative and non-significant effect on the importer 
side. Corruption remains a negative factor for trade growth. For example, the control of 
corruption as a proxy for good governance positively and significantly affects trade flows. 
Evaluations of GDP and effective exchange rates for the 10 countries from 2005- 
2018 demonstrate the same impact. However, in explaining trade flows, the two dummy 
variables (contiguity, the common language) are very important. Contij harms bilateral trade. 
These findings indicate that there will be more sharing between two countries with shared 
borders. On the other hand, the common languages are positive in promoting intra-regional 
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trade. As far as corruption is concerned, our findings show the good governance of regional 
trade through an anti-corruption institutional framework. We should note in this regard that 
the negative effect of corruption on international trade is more important for 10 countries 
and in regard to our findings in Tables, we accept the null hypotheses of HI, HII. The results 
of accept/reject of the research hypotheses are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12. Results of the checked hypotheses of the final master thesis 
 
Hypotheses Variable Predicted 
sign 
Estimated 
sign 
Result 
H1 H0 The high level of corruption 
in oil exporting countries 
which can affect economic 
growth and bilateral trade 
CORRUPij Negative In OLS – 
positive 
In PPML - 
negative 
Accept 
H0 
H1 The high level of corruption 
in oil exporting countries 
which can not affect 
economic growth and 
bilateral trade 
CORRUPij Negative In OLS – 
positive 
In PPML - 
negative 
Accept 
H0 
H2 H0 The high level of corruption 
in the oil exporting countries 
may reduce the effectiveness 
of international trade 
CORRUPij Negative In OLS – 
positive 
In PPML - 
negative 
Accept 
H0 
H1 The high level of corruption 
in the oil exporting countries 
may not reduce the 
effectiveness of international 
trade 
CORRUPij Negative In OLS – 
positive 
In PPML - 
negative 
Accept 
H0 
H3 H0 Positive influence of the real 
effective exchange rate on 
the development of 
international trade in the oil 
sector. 
REER Positive Negative Accept 
H1 
H1 Negative influence of the 
real effective exchange rate 
on the development of 
international trade in the oil 
sector. 
REER Positive Negative Accept 
H1 
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3.2. Discussion of results 
 
 
The result of this research supports previous researches, showing that the corruption 
of exporting and importing countries has a significant and negative effect on export (Dutt 
and Traca, 2007), (Anderson and Marocouiller, 2000). The findings in this research are very 
different and show that there is no significant influence on the export volume in Indonesia 
on the corruption of importing countries. Since Kazakhstan has very low rates of corruption 
in nine export destinations. Another researches on corruption and international trade show 
that the corruption perception index of exporting and importing countries has a positive 
relationship with the export values of several European countries (Voicu and Horsewood, 
2006, 2011, 2012). Voicu and Horsewood (2006, 2011, 2012) also show that the effect of 
corruption is more perceived by exporting countries than importing countries. According to 
this report, Kazakhstan as an exporting country is more affected by corruption. Thus, the 
regulatory structure and corporate ethics must be strengthened if a nation establishes trade 
with other countries. 
Research indicates that Kazakhstan's GDP and Kazakhstan's export to 9 destination 
countries has a good relationship. Increased Kazakhstan GDP triggered increased exports to 
nine destination countries (the Growth led Export Hypothesis). According to the analysis 
above exports of products and services were growing. It can be explained that an increase in 
economic income will promote an increase in production factors in a country. An increased 
availability of goods and services will result. Increased output factors. Increased supply not 
only for domestic demand, but also for export products is occurring in goods and services. 
The rapid technology and innovation transfer in domestic industries will, according to 
Findlay (1984), encourage an expanded economy-based export production. 
Many models are based on the findings of significant literature contributions and are 
proposing refining of established estimators by means of the SST database (2006), the main 
contribution in the literature to heteroscedastic, the prevalence of zero commercial values, 
which is crucial for validating our results and our comparative study. The data comprises 
bilateral export flows cross-sectional in 1990 from 136 countries. A detailed overview of 
data can be found in SST (2006), including the list of countries, versions, sources, etc. The 
'real GDP per capita,' 'population,' 'location,' 'width.' The explication variables include the 
'bilateral exports,' while the 'preferential trade agreements' are the explanatory variables. The 
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explaining variables often include a collection of dumb variables designed to catch 
'contiguity', 'common language' and 'colonial relations' and 'water access.' 
It should be noted that our findings are completely consistent with the results of SST 
(2006). In part, our estimations are equal to the entire PPML sample and the sub-sample. 
The SST (2006) findings are also true. Probably, the PPML estimator better handles the 
heteroscedasticity relative to other estimators. The PPML estimates further indicate, as 
compared to higher values than other models (e.g. OLS GDP average elasticities are above 
90 percent and around 80 percent for export' s GDP and importer's GDP), that the importer's 
and exporter's GDP describe just above 70 percent of trade between countries. The SST 
findings (1966) also comply with estimates of other variables, such as size, remoteness, and 
access to water and preferential trade arrangements, which are the same findings. It means 
that, with the heteroscedasticity and zero trade values, the PPML calculations vary from 
other models. 
According to Rose (2005), the gravity model is estimated for three different data 
sets. The first one is a sample of 180 countries over the period from 1980 to 2000. The second 
dataset consists of a sample of 65 countries similar to Márquez, Martínez, and Suárez (2007), 
with data every five years over the period from 1980 to 1999. Finally, a third sample of 47 
countries accordingly to Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009) is used, covering the period from 
1980 to 1999. In the three studies, the proportion of zero export values is 13, 15, and 23%. 
The modern model of seriousness is considered as well as the technically justified model of 
gravity with multilateral terms of resistance as exporter and importer dummy variables 
(Anderson & Wincoop, 2003). 
The distribution of all three samples of the dependent variable, total exports, shows 
right skewness, as no exports are negative and some pairs of countries do not trade with each 
other. For the first study in 1990, summary statistics are mean = 1.82e+08, variance = 
3.29e+18, skewness = 28.59645, and kurtosis = 1155,022. The purpose of normalizing the 
distribution is to take natural logarithms. The statistics for log exports shall be equal in 
summary terms to mean=14.17866; variance=16.51199; skewness= -.8381542 and 
kurtosis=0.054987. Although the transition closer to the normal distribution, the standard 
test still rejects the presumption of normality. 
We argue in this chapter that standard practice for logging the gravity model on a 
linear basis and for calculating the least-square parameters of interest is not sufficient. The 
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fundamental issue with this approach is that log-linearization leads to conflicting estimates 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity. One additional issue is that log-linearization is 
incompatible with zero data flows, and lack of zero trade flows results in a skewed way as 
nulls are not usually distributed randomly. 
Therefore, we have to be able to understand why the difference in estimates is as 
high as they are, how heteroscedasticity is patterned, and why an especially big prediction 
for this particular sample will occur. Recall that in the special cases where the OLs error 
term (ijt) is homoscedastic OLS estimates are consistent. A useful way to visualize how far 
from the data this is to be met is by using what calls a "wandering scheme" (Tukey, 1977). 
In order to produce this scheme — which is illustrated in Figure 8—for each bin collecting 
observations of similar trade values, we first group all residuals from the calculation into 20 
bins of equal size. We then group these containers from the smallest to the largest forecast 
value and create modified box plots to summarize the error terms within each container. The 
residuals from our key OLS specification (i.e. column 2 in Table 11) are obviously not 
homoscedastic, as the above-left panel in figure 8 shows — in the visual acquisition of our 
previous park test results. Specifically, the boxes for the first and third quartiles of each 
sample (reflecting the adjoining values) and the associated whiskers (reflecting the adjacent 
values) expand from left to right gradually, as observations with greater expected trade value 
considerations, suggesting that the variance of such waste is inversely linked to the 
contingent imply across the whole sample. This does not mean that, for larger trade flows, 
the gaps between observed flows and equipped ones are not smaller. Instead, the percentage 
gap is increasing. 
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Figure 9 - Heteroscedasticity visualization in the data: residuals of OLS vs. Predicted 
log trade. Flows, Binned by Size. 
 
In order to explore in more detail how the differences between linear and PPML estimates 
evolve with the composition of the reference group, Figure 9plots estimates for both the 
linear and PPML models, starting with the EU as a whole and then adding one country at a 
time to GDP in 2013. These estimates show that the addition of more and more (smaller) 
countries leads to an ever-increasing OLS estimate — even for the addition of the world's 
smallest economies — while the PPML estimates stabilize after the inclusion of around 40 
additional countries. This differential is by no means surprising based on the previous 
discussion: by including smaller and smaller countries in the sample, we tend to 
heteroscedasticity the data and thus increase the partiality in the OLS estimate. 
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Figure 10 – The results of the EMU Coefficient Estimates Comparison Group of non- 
EMU countries 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, we notice that, in addition to the survey, the PPML and OLS figures 
shown in Figure 9 are typically affected in the same way. The estimates for PPML and OLS 
show both that trade between EMU members has decreased, relative to trade between them 
with the rest of the European Union and with the six largest non-EU economies (US, China, 
Japan, Brazil, and India), which together make up more than two-thirds of non-EMU 's GDP 
worldwide. However, intra-EMU exchange seems to have expanded in comparison to 
smaller allies, beginning with the seventh-largest non-EMU economy in Canada. The 
optimistic and important overall OLS estimation of the EMU impact we find tends to be 
strongly affected by the obvious decline in trade within the sample between the EMU and 
several smaller, non-EMU countries as opposed to intra-EMU trades in the light of these 
trends. Given that PPML does naturally reduce the number of small reference groups and 
that this pattern is not found for the most important external partners of the EMU, this data 
feature could explain some of the differences between the PPML and OLS EMU estimates. 
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The gravity model is considered one of the most successful empirical frameworks 
in international economics. It has become a successful tool for the evaluation of trade 
policies or the calculation of trade potential associated with regional integration. However, 
a more detailed analysis of the underpinnings, the use of larger datasets and improvements 
in statistical and econometric software have highlighted new problems in estimating the 
gravity equation. 
The key aim of this chapter is to evaluate corruption and trade in oil exporting 
countries and to investigate whether corruption hampers foreign trade or promotes cross- 
border commerce. In the course of the work, a panel model of gravitational data was 
considered, in which the criteria for sampling were two distinct geographical regions. Our 
findings demonstrate the adverse effect on foreign commerce from different sources of 
unethical behavior. More typical findings, indicating the need for global convergence, 
indicate a positive effect of transparency on the amount of exchange. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The aims of this research were: Collecting data for estimations and calculations; 
Modeling econometrics equation and hypotheses; Applying the gravity model to better 
understand the importance of the main determinants of international trade between 10 
observed countries and its destruction because of corruption Analyzing the results 
The three main parts of the master thesis outlined the stages of developing and researching: 
Literature from various authors who described the results of their work on the impact of 
corruption on trade was analyzed. It was summarized that corruption exists in various 
spheres of activity, and defined as the use of power to obtain greater benefits. The impact of 
corruption on trade is assessed as its negative impact on the development of international 
trade. For the second part of the study, data from the World Bank, OECD, Transparency 
International, CPI, and tradingeconomics.com were collected. To achieve the goal of the 
master's thesis and to assess the impact of corruption on trade was used the gravitational 
model was used, which is the best model for predicting bilateral trade flows. 
In the third part of the master's thesis, was collected data and was assessed the impact of 
corruption on international trade in oil exporting countries. Getting results were summarized 
and evaluated. 
And what was done as a result in this research: was collected the theoretical 
background and literature review concerning the impact of corruption on trade in oil 
exporting countries. Data from 10 countries were collected to assess the impact of corruption 
on trade in oil exporting countries. The main criteria for the selected countries were the level 
of corruption and the volume of oil exports. The data collection period for the study was 
from 2000 to 2018. Calculations were made between Kazakhstan and 9 other countries 
(Brazil, China, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Mexico, Russia, United Arab Emirates). The main 
variables that were used to assess the impact of corruption on trade CORRUPij is the 
corruption index between country i and country j, Difcorrupij is a measure of the country- 
pair disparity in the degree of corruption, Xij-bilateral trade, REER - the real effective 
exchange rate. To evaluate the assumptions, 3 hypotheses were constructed, which were 
verified by the gravitational model using ordinary least squares and Poisson pseudo- 
Maximum likelihood methods. Hypothesis 1 - the high level of corruption in oil-exporting 
countries, which can affect economic growth and bilateral trade. Hypothesis 2 - the high 
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level of corruption in oil exporting countries may reduce the effectiveness of international 
trade. Hypothesis 3 - the positive impact of the real effective exchange rate on the 
development of international trade in the oil sector. Subsequently, after estimating three 
hypotheses, our model showed that 1 2 hypotheses are null hypotheses. And the expected 
positive impact of the real effective exchange rate on the development of international trade 
in the oil sector in hypothesis 3 was negative. Were applied a gravity model for international 
trade and were used the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) and PPML (Poisson Pseudo- 
Maximum Likelihood) estimators and got a deeper understanding of the impact of corruption 
on trade in oil exporting countries. 
As a result, the main objectives were reached and the results explain the effects of 
corruption on trade. Looking at the results and analysis made over the period from 2000 to 
2018 on the impact of oil exports in 10 countries, it was observed that there is a negative 
relation between the corruption index and real GDP (Gross Domestic Product). From the 
end, there is a positive meaning of oil exports. It implies they have empirically led to export 
development while corruption has adversely impacted foreign trade. The decline in oil 
exports would also impact bilateral trade and economic development to a degree as it is the 
engine development of the oil-exporting countries’ economies. The higher the corruption 
rate the lower the development of the oil sector 's bilateral exchange, as well as the foreign 
expenditure ratio. Considering that the oil sector has become the generator growth of the 
economy, monitoring the activities is expedient for the government to ensure accurate and 
better results. 
Based on this research, it can be concluded that the effect of corruption on trade in 
oil exporting countries is significant. Estimations of Ordinary Least Squares and Poisson 
Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimators show that corruption has a negative effect on 
bilateral trade, income per capita differential has a positive and significant effect on 
Kazakhstan’s export to nine destination countries. Distance (DISTij) and common border 
(CONTij) between country pairs have no significant coefficients and it means that these 
variables are not effect on the trade flows. Common language (COMLANGij) has a positive 
value but it is not important. Countries can create trade flows while they have different 
languages. 
From my point of view, the study is quite interesting, and this work can be 
fundamental for further researches in similar studies that investigate the impact of corruption 
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on trade in oil exporting countries. But it is worth considering that corruption is a global 
problem and the research of this problem can cover many industries. 
Based on the empirical research conducted in a theoretical and econometric 
manner, it can be recommended that the government could adopt some of the measures 
listed below to further improve international trade relations between countries and reduce 
the level of corruption: 
1. The government needs to work out more strictly control over the correctness and 
legality of companies ' actions. 
2. Improving the control of oil export operations and taking strict measures to detect 
violations in the workplace can reduce the level of corruption. 
3. The ability to change the system in the field of oil production and establish processes 
for concluding contracts. 
4. To eradicate corruption, I believe that it is necessary to change the mentality of 
people and their attitude to state bodies. 
5. The government needs to set up the work of structures and bodies to quickly and 
effectively address the requests of companies. It is necessary to restore trust between 
state structures and companies not only producing and exporting oil, but also the trust 
of other companies and citizens in general. 
6. Trade-oriented countries need to develop domestic macroeconomic conditions, such 
as financial reforms to improve trade flows and to use these reforms as anti- 
corruption reforms. 
Corruption also refers to self-serving purposes, theft, bribes that many go to for 
profit. With the well-established work of state structures, with the control of the work of 
companies that operate in the country, the fulfillment of all the requirements and conditions 
under the law, it is possible to reduce corruption and change the attitude and mentality of 
people. Fair and legal decisions of the Supreme court, which show and prove that corruption 
is punishable by law, will inform the entire society as a whole about an honest attitude to 
their own and others’ work. 
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEX 1: The glossary of terms 
 
Bilateral trade - is the exchange of goods between two nations promoting trade and 
investment (Investopedia,2019). 
Corruption - dishonest or illegal behavior, especially of people in authority (Oxford 
Learner’s Dictionary,2019). 
Corruption perception index [CPI] –is the index, which ranks 180 countries and territories 
by their perceived levels of public sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, 
uses a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean (Transparency 
International, 2018). 
Dummy variable - is a numeric variable that represents categorical data, such as gender, 
race, political affiliation, etc. (Statistic dictionary, 2020). 
 
Heteroskedasticity - In statistics, heteroskedasticity (or heteroscedasticity) happens when 
the standard errors of a variable, monitored over a specific amount of time, are non-constant 
(Investopedia, 2019). 
 
Independent variable- is a variable (often denoted by x) whose variation does not depend 
on that of another (Oxford Dictionary, 2019). 
 
International Trade - is the exchange of capital, goods, and services across international 
borders or territories[1] because there is a need or want of goods or services 
(Wikipedia,2019). 
Net present value [NPV] - is the difference between the present value of cash inflows and 
the present value of cash outflows over a period of time (Investopedia, 2020). 
The gravity model- is a model  that,  in  its  traditional  form,  predicts  bilateral trade 
flows based on the economic sizes and distance between two units. Research shows that 
there is "overwhelming evidence that trade tends to fall with distance (Carrère, Céline; 
Mrázová, Monika; Neary, J. Peter, (2020) .Gravity without Apology: The Science of 
Elasticities, Distance, and Trade). 
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ANNEX 2: Abbreviations 
 
CCI – Control Corruption Index 
 
EITI - Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
NPV - Net present value 
 
OECD - Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
OPEC - Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OLS – The Ordinary Least Squares 
PEP - Politically Exposed Person 
PPML - Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimators 
SCI – Structural Corruption Index 
StAR - The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative 
 
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
WB – World Bank 
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ANNEX 3: Diagnostic tests results 
 
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
F-statistic 3.159915 Probability 0.000000 
Obs*R-squared 110.2330 Probability 0.000159 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -12993.98 4964.126 -2.617577 0.0101 
LOG(GDPi) 351.7419 99.68701 3.528463 0.0006 
(LOG(GDPi))^2 -1.307440 2.037026 -0.641838 0.5223 
(LOG(GDPi))*(LOG(GDPj)) 1.887743 1.870383 1.009281 0.3151 
(LOG(GDPi))*REERi -0.029360 0.250984 -0.116981 0.9071 
(LOG(GDPi))*REERj 0.040034 0.047958 0.834784 0.4057 
(LOG(GDPi))*(LOG(DISTij)) -41.02911 12.02050 -3.413263 0.0009 
(LOG(GDPi))*DIFFij 0.000616 0.000288 2.137613 0.0348 
(LOG(GDPi))*DIFCORRUPij 0.048857 0.183202 0.266686 0.7902 
(LOG(GDPi))*CORRUPij 0.303629 0.486324 0.624336 0.5337 
(LOG(GDPi))*CONTij 36.10730 14.01339 2.576629 0.0113 
(LOG(GDPi))*COMLANGij -37.84353 9.905154 -3.820590 0.0002 
LOG(GDPj) -289.1110 169.0751 -1.709957 0.0901 
(LOG(GDPj))^2 -2.299968 0.932148 -2.467386 0.0152 
(LOG(GDPj))*REERi 0.021144 0.042080 0.502484 0.6163 
(LOG(GDPj))*REERj 0.064890 0.057996 1.118866 0.2657 
(LOG(GDPj))*(LOG(DISTij)) 32.55927 19.99419 1.628436 0.1063 
(LOG(GDPj))*DIFFij -0.000331 0.000183 -1.806146 0.0737 
(LOG(GDPj))*DIFCORRUPij 0.012501 0.089272 0.140036 0.8889 
(LOG(GDPj))*CORRUPij 0.106922 0.349061 0.306312 0.7600 
(LOG(GDPj))*CONTij -22.51834 19.00303 -1.184987 0.2386 
(LOG(GDPJ))*COMLANGij 33.31352 17.93442 1.857519 0.0660 
REERi 2.088297 2.455388 0.850496 0.3969 
REERi^2 4.89E-05 0.004537 0.010772 0.9914 
REERi*REERj -0.001064 0.002088 -0.509558 0.6114 
REERi*(LOG(DISTij)) -0.110948 0.305663 -0.362975 0.7173 
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REERi*DIFFij -6.04E-07 1.64E-05 -0.036801 0.9707 
REERi*DIFCORRUPij -0.010473 0.022541 -0.464626 0.6431 
REERi*CORRUPij -0.025824 0.056741 -0.455122 0.6499 
REERi*CONTij -0.110320 0.444036 -0.248449 0.8043 
REERi*COMLANGij -0.209700 0.209510 -1.000905 0.3191 
REERj 0.311223 3.034697 0.102555 0.9185 
REERj^2 -0.005301 0.002687 -1.972869 0.0511 
REERj*(LOG(DISTij)) 0.045018 0.343220 0.131163 0.8959 
REERj*DIFFij -1.08E-05 1.17E-05 -0.928984 0.3550 
REERj*DIFCORRUPij -0.009450 0.005478 -1.725060 0.0874 
REERj*CORRUPij 0.013693 0.014293 0.958042 0.3402 
REERj*CONTij -0.374487 0.488756 -0.766205 0.4452 
REERj*COMLANGij -0.549131 0.225422 -2.436014 0.0165 
LOG(DISTij) 3167.289 1245.996 2.541973 0.0124 
(LOG(DISTij))^2 -188.4468 74.84819 -2.517720 0.0133 
(LOG(DISTij))*DIFFij 0.006575 0.001900 3.460982 0.0008 
(LOG(DISTij))*DIFCORRUPij 0.600399 0.656607 0.914396 0.3625 
(LOG(DISTij))*CORRUPij -0.341805 1.320823 -0.258781 0.7963 
(LOG(DISTij))*CONTij 337.4072 152.0169 2.219537 0.0285 
(LOG(DISTij))*COMLANGij -33.86813 67.61160 -0.500922 0.6174 
DIFFij -0.062017 0.016415 -3.778006 0.0003 
DIFFij^2 -1.02E-09 1.49E-08 -0.068367 0.9456 
DIFFij*DIFCORRUPij 2.24E-05 3.26E-05 0.685619 0.4944 
DIFFij*CORRUPij 1.67E-05 4.92E-05 0.338425 0.7357 
DIFFij*CONTij -0.002309 0.001960 -1.178011 0.2414 
DIFFij*COMLANGij 0.007975 0.001936 4.120190 0.0001 
DIFCORRUPij -2.153193 6.271165 -0.343348 0.7320 
DIFCORRUPij^2 -0.028635 0.021250 -1.347533 0.1806 
DIFCORRUPij*CORRUPij -0.048135 0.071133 -0.676691 0.5000 
DIFCORRUPIJ*CONTij -0.286858 0.854903 -0.335544 0.7379 
DIFCORRUPij*COMLANGij 0.213610 0.561985 0.380098 0.7046 
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CORRUPij 4.893555 11.86428 0.412461 0.6808 
CORRUPij^2 -0.042991 0.085400 -0.503409 0.6157 
CORRUPij*CONTij -0.378780 2.105501 -0.179900 0.8576 
CORRUPIJ*COMLANGIJ -0.796181 1.186129 -0.671243 0.5035 
CONTij -3354.417 1644.463 -2.039825 0.0438 
CONTij*COMLANGij 468.6770 643.1550 0.728715 0.4678 
R-squared 0.644637 Mean dependent var 5.901598 
Adjusted R-squared 0.440633 S.D. dependent var 8.545688 
S.E. of regression 6.391395 Akaike info criterion 6.825092 
Sum squared resid 4411.792 Schwarz criterion 7.982547 
Log likelihood -520.5453 F-statistic 3.159915 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.000020 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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ANNEX 4: The collected data for estimations in Eviews program 
 
Year Xij GDPi GDPj DISTij CONTij COMLANGij CORRUPij DIFCORRUPTij DIFFij REERi REERj Countries 
2000 1710262,2 18,292 259,71 2272,57 0 1 25,0998 9 -542,6 104 54,059 KZ Russia 
2001 1733411,5 22,153 306,6 2272,57 0 1 24,91987 4 -609,43 103 63,526 KZ Russia 
2002 1497738,2 24,637 345,47 2272,57 0 1 24,91987 -4 -719,51 103 66,466 KZ Russia 
2003 1967740,4 30,834 430,35 2272,57 0 1 25,45584 -3 -907,01 95 68,806 KZ Russia 
2004 2836285,59 43,152 591,02 2272,57 0 1 24,81935 -6 -1228,1 97 74,305 KZ Russia 
2005 2926578,21 57,124 764,02 2272,57 0 1 24,97999 2 -1552,2 100,4 81,135 KZ Russia 
2006 3730036,51 81,004 989,93 2272,57 0 1 25,4951 1 -1628,6 108 88,934 KZ Russia 
2007 4658919,35 104,85 1,3 2272,57 0 1 21,97726 -2 -2329,8 106 93,498 KZ Russia 
2008 6227049,28 133,442 1,661 2272,57 0 1 21,49419 1 -3121,7 109 99,072 KZ Russia 
2009 3546966,53 115,309 1,223 2272,57 0 1 24,37212 5 -1397,6 128 92,15 KZ Russia 
2010 3006543,08 148,047 1,525 2272,57 0 1 24,67793 8 -1604,5 110 100 KZ Russia 
2011 7514522 192,627 2,052 2272,57 0 1 25,45584 3 -2717,2 110 104,416 KZ Russia 
2012 6747212,05 207,999 2,21 2272,57 0 1 28 0 -3047,9 110,5 105,581 KZ Russia 
2013 5875273,58 236,635 2,297 2272,57 0 1 26,98148 -2 -2116,5 115 107,003 KZ Russia 
2014 6388500,43 221,416 2,06 2272,57 0 1 27,98214 2 -1293,5 116 97,724 KZ Russia 
2015 4547502,1 184,388 1,364 2272,57 0 1 28,49561 -1 1197 132 79,568 KZ Russia 
2016 3509161,68 137,278 1,283 2272,57 0 1 29 0 -1030,5 85 79,253 KZ Russia 
2017 4639035,21 166,806 1,579 2272,57 0 1 29,98333 2 -1503 95 91,447 KZ Russia 
2018 5279873,69 179,34 1,658 2272,57 0 1 29,46184 3 -1476,3 90,3 84,54 KZ Russia 
2000 672548,6 18,292 1,211 3656 0 1 30,4959 -1 269,63 104 92,759 KZ China 
2001 646650,7 22,153 1,339 3656 0 1 30,74085 -8 437,82 103 96,765 KZ China 
2002 1018679,9 24,637 1,471 3656 0 1 28,37252 -12 509,52 103 94,555 KZ China 
2003 1653081 30,834 1,66 3656 0 1 28,56571 -10 779,48 95 88,38 KZ China 
2004 1966911,13 43,152 1,955 3656 0 1 27,34959 -12 1365,6 97 85,846 KZ China 
2005 2422506,65 57,124 2,286 3656 0 1 28,84441 -6 2017,9 100,4 84,919 KZ China 
2006 3592514,16 81,004 2,752 3656 0 1 29,29164 -7 3192,3 108 86,255 KZ China 
2007 5635914,31 104,85 3,55 3656 0 1 27,11088 -14 4077,4 106 89,33 KZ China 
2008 7676608,96 133,442 4,594 3656 0 1 28,14249 -14 5045,3 109 97,024 KZ China 
2009 5888592,5 115,309 5,102 3656 0 1 31,17691 -9 3333 128 101,111 KZ China 
2010 10122070,04 148,047 6,087 3656 0 1 31,85906 -6 4520 110 100 KZ China 
2011 16291513,14 192,627 7,552 3656 0 1 31,17691 -9 6015,9 110 102,724 KZ China 
2012 16484409 207,999 8,532 3656 0 1 33,04542 -11 6069,8 110,5 108,707 KZ China 
2013 14373748,04 236,635 9,57 3656 0 1 32,24903 -14 6840 115 114,638 KZ China 
2014 9799418,42 221,416 10,439 3656 0 1 32,31099 -7 5155,9 116 118,337 KZ China 
2015 5480137,49 184,388 11,016 3656 0 1 32,18695 -9 2477,4 132 129,948 KZ China 
2016 4214925,9 137,278 11,138 3656 0 1 34,05877 -11 -363,95 85 123,622 KZ China 
2017 5797975,62 166,806 12,143 3656 0 1 35,65109 -10 488,54 95 120,06 KZ China 
2018 6307476,19 179,34 13,608 3656 0 1 34,77068 -8 41,754 90,3 121,674 KZ China 
2000 6,342 18,292 707,91 12124 1 1 31,46427 -3 -5928,8 104 115,545 KZ Mexico 
2001 55,42 22,153 756,71 12124 1 1 31,60696 -10 -6053,6 103 123,019 KZ Mexico 
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2002 69,21 24,637 772,11 12124 1 1 28,77499 -13 -5935,1 103 123,05 KZ Mexico 
2003 44,5 30,834 729,34 12124 1 1 29,39388 -12 -5007,2 95 110,189 KZ Mexico 
2004 97,21 43,152 782,24 12124 1 1 28,14249 -14 -4610,2 97 105,977 KZ Mexico 
2005 931,75 57,124 877,48 12124 1 1 30,16621 -9 -4506,4 100,4 109,803 KZ Mexico 
2006 2,24 81,004 975,39 12124 1 1 29,29164 -7 -3776,7 108 109,904 KZ Mexico 
2007 30,42 104,85 1,053 12124 1 1 27,11088 -14 -2871,3 106 108,373 KZ Mexico 
2008 23,31 133,442 1,11 12124 1 1 28,14249 -14 -1503 109 106,08 KZ Mexico 
2009 236,1 115,309 900,05 12124 1 1 29,84962 -6 -837,75 128 92,78 KZ Mexico 
2010 64,91 148,047 1,058 12124 1 1 29,98333 -2 -200,91 110 100 KZ Mexico 
2011 1076,46 192,627 1,18 12124 1 1 28,4605 -3 1430,6 110 99,799 KZ Mexico 
2012 13,9 207,999 1,201 12124 1 1 30,8545 -6 2145 110,5 96,629 KZ Mexico 
2013 171,63 236,635 1,274 12124 1 1 29,73214 -8 -56835 115 102,272 KZ Mexico 
2014 790,98 221,416 1,315 12124 1 1 31,85906 -6 1884,9 116 101,247 KZ Mexico 
2015 323,65 184,388 1,171 12124 1 1 31,30495 -7 904,82 132 90,745 KZ Mexico 
2016 702,19 137,278 1,078 12124 1 1 29,49576 -1 -1024,9 85 79,022 KZ Mexico 
2017 1745,45 166,806 1,158 12124 1 1 29,98333 2 -30,837 95 80,879 KZ Mexico 
2018 3240,43 179,34 1,221 12124 1 1 29,46184 3 139,16 90,3 80,993 KZ Mexico 
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